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Abstract

Transboundary pollution challenges the conventional economic analysis of pollution as a
negative externality to market activity. Different political entities cannot regulate pollution that
flows among them. Developing institutions to regulate pollution is impossible at the international
level due to the principle of state sovereignty. Game theory offers economic insight into the
strategic interactions among nations that experience and contribute to transboundary pollution.
Though game theory underestimates nations proclivities to remain cooperative, the conclusions
of models align with real-world experience. Barriers to resolving transboundary pollution include
the polluter pays principle and liability norms.
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Thaure 1
Introduction:

Many complicated forms of environmental pollution involve transmission mechanisms
that disperse damages over a vast geographical scale. These transmission mechanisms allow
pollutants to travel and accumulate far from their points of origin. Some of these pollutants
accumulate in environmental sinks held in common between nations, sinks such as rivers,
forests, and other ecosystems. Other pollutants accumulate in global environmental sinks, like
the planet's atmosphere and oceans. These sorts of pollutants display a complete disregard for
geographical or political boundaries, hence the inspiration for the title transboundary pollution.
Transboundary pollution poses a unique conundrum to policymakers. Many of the most
critical environmental problems the world faces today result from transboundary pollution
between different political entities. International law and relations both operate on the principle
of state sovereignty, whereby no nation may be subject to the authority of another nation without
its explicit or tacit consent.1 Maintenance of sovereignty prevents nations from regulating each
other's contributions to transboundary pollution. So, the resolution of transboundary pollution
disputes requires cooperation between nations. At the same time, the interests of different nations
often compete and conflict with each other, preventing the cooperation required for resolution. In
an international realm that holds sovereignty as a fundamental right to every nation, most
international environmental problems that involve transboundary pollution simply remain
unresolved until critical damage, or the threat of critical damage, manifests. Transboundary
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pollution continues to spark debate and concern as the international community struggles to
negotiate tangible solutions.
Most of the academic literature on transboundary pollution employs a very narrow
definition of the concept. Commonly, transboundary pollution is defined as pollution that affects
multiple nations, where many nations are responsible for emissions.2 This definition suffers from
two oversights. First, it implies that transboundary pollution only occurs at the international
level. However, transboundary pollution may occur between any political entities that cannot
regulate each other, including towns, cities, and states. Second, the conventional definition
implies that multiple entities bear responsibility for transboundary pollution. However, many
cases of transboundary pollution involve purely unidirectional flows: pollution simply flows
from one entity to another with no element of reciprocity. In fact, the premier lawsuits
concerning transboundary pollution in the United States were both interstate and unidirectional
problems.3 For a more robust perspective and analysis, this project utilizes its own, broader
definition of transboundary pollution: pollution that crosses political boundaries, damaging
jurisdictional territories (state, country, etc.) outside of its origin(s).
From this definition, transboundary pollution may be further divided between two
transmission categories: unidirectional transboundary pollution and reciprocal transboundary
pollution. Unidirectional pollution simply flows from source entities to victim entities, whereas
reciprocal pollution flows between all parties involved. 4 For example, ozone-depleting
substances pose a reciprocal problem. Any nation may emit ozone-depleting substances, putting
other nations at risk of increased exposure to ultraviolet radiation. On the other hand, river
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pollution often poses a unidirectional problem. The physical flow of a river tends to result in a
downstream accumulation of pollution, which allows upstream entities to transfer most of their
pollution to downstream entities. Unidirectional transboundary pollution clearly divides
involvement and repercussions between polluting entities and victim entities. With reciprocal
transboundary pollution, on the other hand, entities each bear damages to the extent that all
involved entities engage in polluting activities.
Conventionally, economists deal with pollution as an efficiency problem. Economics
characterizes pollution as a negative externality to market activity: firms and consumers
participate in a market that damages other entities,5 either through the act of production or
through the use of goods by consumers. In a free market, firms and consumers ignore negative
externalities when making economic decisions, operating only on the basis of their own costs
and benefits. So, a free market that involves pollution does nothing to abate it. The result is an
inefficient outcome. The market produces dead weight loss through excess pollution damage.
There are many different regulatory schemes that correct for negative externalities.
However, not all of them are efficient. Most often, policymakers attempt to control for pollution
through a command and control approach that calls for universal abatement across all firms that
engage in a polluting activity.6 This approach, however, ignores differences in abatement costs
across firms. Some firms have cheaper marginal abatement costs than others, yet command and
control requires all firms to engage in the same level of abatement. The command and control
approach simply trades one inefficiency, negative externalities, for another, needlessly expensive
abatement programs.
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In terms of efficient approaches, regulators may employ a Pigovian tax, a tax on firms or
consumers in a market set at the marginal rate of pollution damage. Or, regulators may instead
opt to restrict market activity through a quota system. A quota system may limit the production
of goods, the number of firms participating in a market, or the number of transactions that take
place in a market. Both Pigovian taxes and quota systems, when set at a level that fully
internalizes the negative external costs at play, bring about an efficient outcome. In this new,
efficient outcome, the price of a good reflects both its marginal cost of production and the
marginal pollution damages involved in its use or production.
Transboundary pollution, however, complicates the conventional economic wisdom. The
approaches listed so far all rely on a regulatory institution with jurisdiction over the entire scope
of pollution damages. However, transboundary pollution flows among different political entities.
For example, solid waste management in the United States takes place over a national market.
Yet, through the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, the federal government assigns the
responsibility of regulating solid waste management to state governments. Often, in response to
state attempts at stricter regulation, disposers simply ship waste to states that impose weaker
regulations and controls. When polluting activities can simply be relocated outside of
regulations, or when regulations are not enforced on the appropriate scale of a polluting activity,
pollution leaks through the regulations, often completely.
Of course, solid waste management in the United States does not pose the same problem
as a global pollutant, such as greenhouse gases. The federal government may, at any time it
chooses, assume the role of national regulator and employ any of the strategies listed previously
to correct transboundary pollution that occurs between states. Hence, most of the literature on
transboundary pollution focuses on international environmental problems because there is no
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supranational entity that may impose binding resolutions between nations. However, simply the
existence of an institution does not guarantee its capability nor willingness to manage
transboundary pollution. At present, states continue to struggle with transboundary issues in solid
waste management in the absence of significant federal initiative. Nonetheless, this project
focuses on international cases of transboundary pollution only. Unlike at the national level, the
principle of state sovereignty prevents the development of a binding regulatory institutions at the
international level.
Despite the absence of binding institutions, many nations attempt to resolve international
transboundary pollution problems. The United Nations Environment Programme lists 132
multilateral agreements concerning international environmental issues since 1991.7 Clearly, most
nations of the world realize that cooperating to resolve transboundary pollution can result in
significant gains for everyone involved. Strategic interaction among different political entities
does not necessarily lead to the destruction of resources held in common.8 However, the lack of
institutions to bind nations to commitments calls many aspects of environmental agreements into
question: to what extent do these agreements resolve transboundary pollution? To what extent do
countries comply with these agreements? What circumstances facilitate compliance? The
conventional economic wisdom of pollution control offers no additional insight into these points.
This project offers a broad analysis of transboundary pollution with respect to real-world
experience and economic theory. Chapter 1 examines a handful of international environmental
agreements that attempt to resolve the world's most critical transboundary pollution problems.
This section outlines agreements based on their organizational structure, enforcement bodies,
noncompliance procedures, compliance incentives, and policy norms. Agreements are evaluated
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on their success in achieving observable abatement increases following their enactment. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a basis of real-world experience with international
transboundary pollution.
Chapter 2 reviews contemporary game theory models of transboundary pollution
interactions. Game theory provides a conceptual mode of analysis that directly acknowledges the
lack of binding regulatory institutions. The chapter begins with a simple prisoner's dilemma and
expands the model by introducing new options for players and relaxing restrictive assumptions.
From this literature review comes a set of general conclusions on transboundary pollution
disputes and their potential for resolution. Ultimately, the literature argues that self-enforcing
environmental agreements are possible, though limited in their potential accomplishments
beyond fundamentally uncooperative outcomes.
Chapter 3 reconciles the conclusions of game theory with real-world experience,
identifying successes and limitations of the models in their conclusions on international
environmental agreements. Though game theory models fail to acknowledge broader motivations
for cooperation in the context of international relations, the models generally predict the success
or failure of cooperation based on the extent of damages and costs involved in a dispute and the
institutions (or lack thereof) employed in an agreement. In addition, real-world experience
supports the conclusion that international agreements have little potential to improve upon the
status quo of a pollution dispute.
Chapter 4 discusses two real-world barriers that prevent better resolution of
transboundary pollution. The first barrier this chapter identifies is the polluter pays principle.
This guiding policy principle acts as a barrier because it prevents nations from engaging in
transfer payments to other nations in exchange for abatement. Such transfer payments promote
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better outcomes, as demonstrated by the game theory analysis presented in Chapter 2. The
second barrier is international norms in liability regimes for transboundary pollution. This
chapter critiques the manner in which international law applies the fundamentals of tort law to
transboundary pollution disputes. On one hand, the norm of state liability has proved unworkable
in application. On the other, the norm of strict liability aggravates bargaining incentives and
induces extreme strategic behavior on the part of both victims and originators of transboundary
pollution. Furthermore, the burden of establishing reasonable standards of care and evidence of
harm renders most transboundary pollution problems unfit for legal resolution.
Finally, this project concludes with basic principles to promote better resolution of
transboundary pollution. As a method to overcome real-world barriers, policymakers should aim
to introduce linkages between different issues of transboundary pollution to encourage
cooperation. Lastly, this section stresses the importance of establishing internal science and
technology programs within international environmental agreements.

Thaure 8
Chapter 1: International Environmental Agreements

This chapter discusses three famous international attempts at regulating transboundary
pollutants: the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, The Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), and the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. All of these agreements cover reciprocal
forms of transboundary pollution. that threaten nations with high levels of environmental
damage. Each agreement experienced different degrees of success depending on the nature of
pollutants they targeted as well as the policy norms and procedures they employed.

Ozone Depleting Substances and the Montreal Protocol

Stratospheric ozone depletion is perhaps the most serious form of global, reciprocal
transboundary pollution that international coordination has reconciled. Though scientists had
long been concerned about ozone depletion in the earth's atmosphere, an anthropogenic
explanation did not surface until the 1970s with investigations into the role of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). CFCs are a wide variety of industrial chemicals used in aerosols
and refrigerants. The chemical stability of CFCs allows them to persist into the stratosphere,
whereby chlorine atoms break off and convert ozone into oxygen.9 The reduction in ozone
allows more ultraviolet radiation to enter the lower atmosphere, dramatically increasing the risk
of skin cancer worldwide. Hence, atmospheric ozone functions as a public good that generates
9
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shared benefits in the form of ozone protection and private costs in the form of abatement.10
Abatement entails a reduction in the use of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances.
Decades of scientific research and international negotiations culminated in 1989 with the
ratification of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Originally, the
agreement called for a 50% reduction in production and consumption of five principal CFCs by
1999 from a 1986 baseline, with interim freeze and elimination controls.11 Since the Protocol has
gone into effect, nations across the globe have dramatically cut CFC usage and production. In
2004, global consumption stood at about 7% of the Protocol's 1986 baseline.12 The Montreal
Protocol is also the only international treaty ever to reserve universal ratification.13 Such results
have led scholars and policymakers to consider the Montreal Protocol a hallmark of international
coordination. Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, claimed in 2003 that
the Montreal Protocol was the "single most successful international agreement to date."14
The Montreal Protocol is simple in terms of obligations. Essentially, signatories are
required to follow the Protocol's reduction goals and freeze controls,15 submit consumption and
production data, and allow for technology transfers. Compliance monitoring relies on the
consumption and production data sets that parties submit. Though this self-reporting mechanism
contains the potential for signatories to falsify their data, review bodies ultimately compile all
submitted data to evaluate trends. Along with implementation and governing committees, the
Protocol establishes a number of expert advisory panels that oversee data collection and
implementation.
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However, what makes the Montreal Protocol relatively unique among international
environmental agreements is its commitment to engaged implementation. To begin with, the
Montreal Protocol establishes a multi-lateral compliance fund, simply referred to as the multilateral fund. It draws from the contributions of developed nations to aid developing nations in the
phase-out of ozone-depleting substances through compliance-inducing projects. The multi-lateral
fund does not function as a pure monetary transfer program. Funding only covers incremental
costs incurred by developing nations towards fulfilling protocol obligations.16 Projects go
through several stages of review and verification before being awarded funding. The World Bank
and three United Nations programs provide implementation oversight for multi-lateral fund
projects.17 These organizations provide the necessary oversight and administrative background to
ensure that funding is managed appropriately and that projects remain feasible. They also
provide an alternative to weak government capacity in developing nations. So, the multi-lateral
fund provides the financial and administrative means to ensure for global phase-out of ozonedepleting substances, allowing all nations, developed and developing, to participate in the
Protocol.
Not only has the multi-lateral fund been instrumental in carrying out implementation, but
also the Montreal Protocol's expert advisory committees. Part of the Montreal Protocol's
institutional structure includes three main advisory committees: a scientific assessment panel, an
environmental assessment panel, and a technology and economic assessment panel.18 These
review bodies provides a direct institutional link between expert scientific, engineering, and
economic communities and the implementation process, ensuring detailed accounts of feasibility
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concerns and practical constraints.19 The scientific assessment panel developed the standardized
metric "ozone-depletion potential" to regulate emissions across targeted ozone-depleting
substances, allowing regulators to focus on the most damaging substances first and signatories to
reduce emissions through a basket approach across targeted substances.20 The technology and
economic assessment panel works with industries that utilize ozone-depleting substances to
encourage new commercial substitutes and determine essential use exemptions.21 The Montreal
Protocol functions not simply as a mandate, but rather a procedure that its own institutions
actively facilitate.
Another peculiar aspect of the Protocol is its reliance on informal procedures and soft
enforcement approaches. The Protocol originally lacked a formal noncompliance procedure.
Though signatories agreed to trade sanctions against noncompliant parties and nonsignatories,
the noncompliance procedure was deferred to after the Protocol's ratification. As such, nations
were not heavily involved with the design of the procedure.22 Instead, the procedure developed
organically through interactions between protocol institutions and parties in response to issues as
they arose. As opposed to an accusatory and dispute resolution system, the Protocol's
noncompliance procedures engages with offending parties informally to encourage compliance.23
Informal procedures have facilitated smooth resolutions and transitions towards compliance. All
original noncompliance issues the Protocol faced were volunteered for resolution by the
offending parties themselves.24 Through informal arrangements, nations have been more willing
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to address noncompliance than they may have been under the threat of harsh penalties and strict
noncompliance procedures.25
However, the sticks and carrots of the Protocol also motivate parties towards addressing
noncompliance. In terms of sticks, the Protocol calls for trade sanctions against noncompliant
members and nonsignatories. Trade sanctions were not only decisive in motivating countries
within the agreement to remain compliant, but also for non-parties that sought to avoid sanctions
by unilaterally complying with the Protocol, as in the case of Taiwan and South Korea.26 At the
same time, the Montreal Protocol offers more in terms of carrots with the multi-lateral fund.
Access to funding not only provides an incentive for developing nations to comply, but also the
means with which to comply. Lack of institutional capacity prevented many developing nations
from compiling production and consumption data.27 Now, every developing nation with a longstanding multi-lateral fund program has reported baseline data.28 Furthermore, the fund even
motivated developing nations to agree to commitments ahead of the Protocol's schedule. Of the
60 countries eligible for the funding, 46 agreed to a complete phase-out sooner than the proposed
schedule.29 Thus, powerful and tangible incentives backed the informal noncompliance
procedure.
Though the Montreal Protocol's institutional design proved successful the characteristics
of ozone-depleting substances were relatively conducive to international negotiation. The
concentration of ozone-depleting substances among few industrial actors in specific nation made
reductions more manageable from a collective action standpoint.30 Also, the chemical industry
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had CFC substitutes in their research and development pipeline by the time of the Montreal
Protocol's implementation.31 Thus, industry opposition, which gridlocked regime development in
the 80s, had petered out.32 As the Montreal Protocol underwent implementation, most states and
industrial producers of ozone-depleting substances had a strong interest in making the regime
work.33
Nevertheless, despite beneficial circumstances, the Montreal Protocol remains unique
among international environmental agreements. It functions with soft enforcement through
several redundancies and non-dedicated review bodies while providing funding for compliance.
Furthermore, it blends a management approach with enforcement to avoid unproductive
antagonism while maintaining a credible threat of tough action.34 The Montreal Protocol displays
institutional synergies unlike any other international agreement while acknowledging practical
constraints to its goals. It owes its success not just to beneficial circumstances, but also ingenious
design.

Acid Rain, Europe, and LRTAP

The peculiar domestic and geographical elements of acid rain set it apart from other
transboundary pollution problems. Acid rain entails both transboundary and domestic damages,
often exacting a greater damage toll on the source nation itself than transboundary victims.
Furthermore, acid rain blurs the unidirectional and reciprocal distinction. For example,
transboundary flows of acid rain in Europe are fairly reciprocal between countries, whereas acid

31

Parson. 1993.
Ibid.
33
Greene. 1998.
34
Victor. 1998.
32

Thaure 14
rain in North America flows mainly from the United States into Canada. Even within the United
States, acid rain flows mainly from Midwestern territories to Northeastern territories. Hence,
acid rain problems differ in transboundary characteristics depending on the geography of parties
at play. Acid rain's fuzzy boundaries complicate resolution and the negotiation process, offering
a primary insight into why acid rain controls have historically met with mixed success.
The first international attempt to regulate transboundary flows of acid rain began in
Europe with the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). Signed in
1979, almost a decade before the Montreal Protocol, it originally held no standards to regulate
emissions among European nations. At the time of its ratification, international transboundary
acid rain was a breakthrough discovery that lacked strong scientific consensus and
understanding. Though Scandinavian scientists proved that acid deposition in their countries
came mostly from other countries35 and the OECD published findings in 1977 that found similar
depositions in other European countries,36 the relative novelty of acid rain put nations in uneasy
negotiating positions. Not only were nations unsure of their contributions to transboundary
pollution, but also of emission control costs an agreement would force them to accept. As such,
LRTAP was designed as a framework agreement for scientific consensus building and future
controls. Originally, it required parties to commit only to exchange information, consultation,
and research.37 It also established a European-wide scientific monitoring program for acid rain,
the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP). As scientists further investigated
acid rain phenomena and damage across Europe, nations agreed to multiple control protocols on
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key emissions: a sulfur dioxide protocol in 1985, a nitrogen oxide protocol in 1988, and a
volatile organic compound protocol in 1991.38
The greatest strength of LRTAP was its ability to build scientific consensus. EMEP
maintained an extensive monitoring program that harmonized data collection, evaluated
competing explanations of damage, and assessed environmental threats.39 EMEP's work later
provided the basis for abatement commitments and critical-load evaluation. Without
harmonization efforts, countries would have been unable to pool their results or make
comparative assessments of environmental quality.40 The development of critical-load
evaluations eventually replaced flat-rate reduction commitments in later emission protocols.
Critical-load evaluations overcame the arbitrary nature and fairness problems of flat-reductions,
providing a scientific basis for emission controls.41
Furthermore, scientific research and consensus strengthened LRTAP's ability to monitor
commitments and pressure recalcitrant parties. Though LRTAP relied on self-reported data from
signatories, scientific assessment in the context of transport models provided a check against
false or doctored data.42 Apparently, the Czech government considered submitting false reports
in the late 1980s, but was discouraged by possible detection through EMEP.43 LRTAP allowed
scientists from across Europe to bypass their national governments and submit data directly to
international bodies, thwarting the interests of Eastern European governments that sought to
suppress knowledge of environmental damages.44
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Still, LRTAP floundered in developing European-wide abatement commitments. Instead
of obtaining strong reduction commitments from each other, nations proposed different levels of
abatement that they considered economical to achieve within their own borders. Most nations
that committed to the emission protocols were already on the path to compliance, while key
source nations either held out or bargained for weaker commitments. For example, many source
nations held out from signing the sulfur dioxide protocol, including significant polluters like the
United Kingdom and most of Eastern Europe.45 Russia only agreed to the protocol on the
condition that it could simply move polluting industries to the other side of the Ural Mountains
while failing to address key sources of European pollution, like its nickel smelters on the Kola
Peninsula.46 Though high-compliant nations attempted to use their status to bully other nations
into compliance, and even pushed the United Kingdom to accept the sulfur dioxide protocol,
poorer nations of Western Europe and all of Eastern Europe escaped LRTAP commitments
almost entirely.47
In addition, much of Europe's emission reductions had little to do with the LRTAP
regime. Rather, many reductions were simply the byproducts of changing domestic energy and
transportation policies. Both the European Commission's power plant directive and the vehicle
emissions directives were motivated by German politicians who sought to level the European
playing field with their domestic policy, not transboundary pollution concerns.48 Many European
nations were already seeking to expand nuclear power, which incidentally reduced acid rain
emissions. Russia's energy sector restructuring was encouraged by their declining resource base
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in Europe and abundant fossil fuels in Siberia.49 Britain's switch to expanded use of natural gas
also had a huge effect on emission reduction.50 As such, indirect concerns take most of the credit
for emission reductions across Europe.
Furthermore, acid rain was so poorly understood at the time of LRTAP's construction and
implementation that, as scientific consensus advanced, many nations underwent emission
reductions not to reduce transboundary flows, but rather to resolve damages within their own
borders. Once Austria, Finland, Switzerland, and the Netherlands became aware of damage
within their countries, they began to pursue emission reductions.51 Germany's reductions were
stimulated by the discovery of large swathes of forest decay within its borders.52 The United
Kingdom, despite the significant transboundary flows it contributed to, discovered extensive
damage within its own borders.53 The fact that abatement programs also alleviated domestic
damages motivated many states towards accepting LRTAP commitments.
So, LRTAP attempted to deal with an unwieldy environmental problem in an unwieldy
fashion. The success it found in reducing emissions stems from regional and domestic concerns
among signatories that were poorly aligned with LRTAP's international focus. Also, LRTAP's
flat-rate reductions collided with the regional realities of acid rain. Acid rain was not
internationally reciprocal across Europe. Rather, focal points and dynamics varied between
regions. Flat-rate reduction did little to correct the behavior of major polluters or change
pollution dynamics. In response to LRTAP's failure for relevant alleviation, many countries went
outside of the agreement to pursue their own multilateral programs for regional concerns. Even
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during LRTAP, Sweden, Finland, and Russia formed regional air quality agreements to better
suit their needs.54

Greenhouse Gases and the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol stands apart from other environmental agreements as a pariah.
Unlike the other agreements highlighted so far, few parties involved in Kyoto had any desire to
see it work. Belligerent negotiations rendered arbitrary and inefficient controls, haphazard
implementation, and poorly planned institutions. Ultimately, Kyoto spent only half of its lifetime
as a legally binding protocol. Even when finally implemented, Kyoto failed to regulate most of
the world's key emitters of greenhouse gases. For those nations it did regulate, the Protocol
achieved little more than a freeze in emissions along its baseline.
As with ozone-depleting substances, scientific investigation revealed the environmental
problems posed by greenhouse gases. However, unlike with ozone-depleting substances,
scientific developments took longer to motivate international negotiations on controls. By the
mid 1970s, scientists had begun to make the connection between carbon dioxide and global
temperature differences.55 The first world climate conference, held in 1979, established a world
climate program among scientists.56 1988 led to the formation of the International Panel on
Climate Change.57 It was not until 1992, with the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
that nations responded to the issue. Under the framework, developed nations and the territories of
the former Soviet Union voluntarily committed to limit their concentration of greenhouse gases
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according to a 1990 emissions baseline.58 Moreover, the FCCC established the foundational
policy norms for the Kyoto Protocol: that pollution should be controlled through inviolable
targets and timetables59 and that developing nations should be excluded from emission controls.
The initial Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997 by 160 nations, arose out of the framework
convention. Under the Protocol, industrialized countries were to cut their emissions of six key
greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride,
hydrofluorocarbons, and perfluorocarbons—by an average of 5.2 percent below their 1990
emission baseline by 2008-2012.60 Most European countries and the United States were given a
7-8 percent reduction target while other countries were simply required to freeze emissions along
their baseline.61 To meet obligations, countries were expected to carry out most of their
abatement efforts domestically.
However, the Protocol established three institutional mechanisms to allow for flexibility
and transnational abatement: joint implementation, carbon markets, and the clean development
mechanism (CDM). Joint implementation is a bilateral process between industrialized countries
whereby one country invests in the abatement efforts of another for emission credit.62 To
incorporate a market mechanism into controls, Kyoto sought to establish carbon markets
whereby nations exchange carbon permits allotted by emission caps; through carbon markets,
nations that abate beyond their goals can sell permits to other nations, promoting cost effective
global abatement. At the same time, Kyoto lacked any legal language that required the creation
of carbon markets;63 parties simply agreed to carbon markets in principle64 and most permit
58
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trading that took place under implementation occurred only among European nations through the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Lastly, the clean development mechanism allowed
developed nations to offset emissions by funding clean energy projects in developing nations.65
Despite the Protocol's initial approval, implementation faltered soon after. The exit of the
United States in 2001 dealt a blow to the Protocol's potential. The United States accounted for
nearly a third of the emissions that the Protocol sought to control.66 Scrambling to save the
Protocol and prevent further exit, signatories convened again in 2001 at Marraketch. The
Marraketch negotiations relaxed Kyoto's controls, lowering targeted reductions among
signatories from an average of 5.2 percent to 1.4 percent.67 Though the Protocol retained the
same regulatory structure and abatement channels, its controls lost most of their strength. Even
after Marraketch, only with Russia's ratification in 2005 did the Kyoto Protocol finally become
legally binding.68 So, negotiations and exit triggers slashed the Protocol down to paltry
commitments by the time it was implemented. Though, with Russia's entry, the 2005 Kyoto
protocol represented approximately half of global emissions,69 it placed low demands on its
signatories and failed to include the United States, the greatest polluter among developed
nations.
Furthermore, Kyoto excluded developing nations from its controls, creating a leakage
channel that undermined abatement efforts. The Kyoto Protocol allowed developing nations to
not only maintain their current pollution levels, but also increase their emissions freely. Even
during Kyoto's discussion and implementation, many developing nations were among the most
significant global emitters of greenhouse gases. Some even had higher emissions than developed
65
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nations beholden to the Protocol. Around 2005, India and South Korea had higher emissions than
Germany and France, respectively.70 It is well known that China ranks right behind the United
States as the world's greatest greenhouse gas emitter, yet China was excluded from any
abatement controls. The Kyoto Protocol's exclusion of developing nations from any form of
emission controls doomed its ability to taper global emissions.
Though signatories successfully weakened the Protocol, they did little to address the
critical flaws of its structure. Firstly, the Protocol's emission targets lacked both a monitoring
mechanisms and an account of full emission lifecycles. In terms of emission lifecycle, while
Kyoto took the destruction of carbon sinks into account for emission levels, it did not fully
account for their creation.71 Kyoto's failure to credit the creation of carbon sinks meant that
signatories could not reliably engage in sink creation projects, like reforestation, to offset their
emissions. In addition, the Protocol had scant means to monitor its targeted greenhouse gases:
except for carbon dioxide, emission sources for target greenhouse gases were not accurately
understood.72 Furthermore, Kyoto's strict control schedules conflicted with emission tendencies.
Greenhouse gas emissions vary with economic growth and technological change, neither of
which can be planned for by governments.73 Attempting emission controls according to the
Kyoto schedule created vast uncertainties for signatories that could only be mitigated through
weak commitments.
Also problematic was the relationship between how emission caps were set and carbon
markets. Essentially, in a carbon market, the price of a permit is the opportunity cost of reducing
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carbon emission and caps are the measure of permit scarcity.74 However, the Protocol's emission
caps were capricious. As caps were set by a historic baseline, countries with inefficient energy
systems received lenient emission caps that bestowed major permit windfalls.75 Russia
commitments serve as a prime example. During Kyoto's initial negotiation in 1997, Russia's
emissions stood at 70% of its 1990 baseline. However, Russia bargained for an emission target
equal to 100% its baseline.76 So, under 1997 controls, assuming no increase in emissions, Russia
could have safely sold emission permits equal to 30% of its cap without engaging in any
abatement whatsoever.
Commentators dubbed these windfalls as "hot air:" permit endowments in excess of
anticipated future emissions.77 Hot air permits are costless to supply because they arise not from
abatement efforts but institutional privilege. Their exchange only results in a financial transfer
between buyer and seller. The buyer of the hot air permit covers part of their responsibility,
while the seller engages in no additional abatement. Thus, hot air permits undermine
environmental quality by crowding out permits supplied by actual abatement.78
Furthermore, permit trading implicitly relies upon a system of property rights that Kyoto
did not attempt to reconcile. Similar pollution permit systems that Kyoto took inspiration from,
like the United States' sulfur emission trading program, were organized under clear, national
systems of property rights. The problem with permit trading between nations is differences in
property law. Permits issued by different nations are not necessarily comparable nor perfect
substitutes.79 Furthermore, international law is poorly suited for adjudicating property rights
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between nations.80 Hence, the main exchange that serviced Kyoto carbon permits was the
European Union Emissions Trading scheme, which served regional trading under a regional
regulatory structure.
The only institution under Kyoto that remotely functioned as intended was the Clean
Development Mechanism. Many developed nations under the Kyoto protocol utilized the
mechanism to ease the cost of their commitments. By 2009, nearly 1200 projects were registered
under the mechanism worldwide, though 60 percent of those projects were implemented in China
alone.81 Also, unlike with carbon markets, Kyoto created an accreditation committee to approve
of projects and determine offset credits.82 Thus, CDM projects took place in a regulated
environment. Though many commentators criticized CDM for the fact that most of its projects
focused on China at the expense of other, poorer developing nations, CDM has nonetheless
served its purpose as a flexibility mechanism for abatement.
In respect to the monumental task Kyoto attempted to address, climate change remains a
problem that modern institutions and political negotiations are ill-equipped to deal with. The
effects of climate change are relatively uncertain, intangible, and lack a distinct timeframe for
expectations.83 In addition, addressing climate change has a greater benefit for future generations
while imposing enormous costs on the present generations. Most abatement measures undertaken
today will not yield stabilizing effects until far into the future.84
Yet Kyoto's architects held poor regard to feasibility or efficiency. They set up controls
that were neither steeped in science nor respectful of costs. They proposed institutions without
following through to design them properly. Instead of finding common resolution, they
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antagonized rich and poor nations against each other. Worse, instead of admitting the Protocol's
faults and attempting to start fresh, Kyoto's architects simply surrendered all potential success in
controlling global greenhouse gas emissions for the sake of implementation. Kyoto stands as a
monumental failure of collective environmental action.

Conclusions

As these agreements demonstrate, the international community has experienced both
extraordinary successes and failures with respect to resolving transboundary pollution. In
addition, these agreements show that the threat of immense environmental damage does not
necessarily guarantee resolution. Rather, resolution depends in part on the immediacy and clarity
of environmental threats. Ozone depletion and acid rain both threatened the international
community with tangible damages, increased skin cancer for the former and destruction of
natural resources vital to economic needs for the latter, whereas the effects of climate change
continue to remain mired in uncertainty. Success also depends upon the personal interests of all
nations involved in a transboundary pollution problem. Acid rain controls met with success due
to incidental changes in energy policy. The Montreal Protocol offered financial aid to encourage
abatement from developing nations, giving them a financial incentive and the means to comply.
Kyoto offered nothing and found no harmonization with incidental benefits, so it failed to
generate much reform or abatement at all.

Thaure 25
Chapter 2: Game Theory Models of Transboundary Pollution

From an economic perspective, transboundary pollution involves strategic interactions
between nations. The benefits that a nation receives from engaging in abatement of
transboundary pollution depend not only on its individual efforts, but also on the efforts of all
other relevant nations. With no central institution to bind nations to commitments, each nation
must consider the strategies of other nations in order to secure the best outcome for themselves.
Hence, transboundary pollution may be modeled through game theory as a strategic interaction
between nations. Game theory offers a mode of analysis that aligns with the central
characteristics of transboundary pollution. Primarily, game theory models acknowledge the
absence of binding control institutions. Secondly, game theory weighs the interests of groups
against the potentially conflicting interests of individuals.
Scholars of game theory have shown interest in developing models that explain the
cooperation dynamics of transboundary pollution problems. This chapter explores various
models circulating throughout the literature to arrive at a set of conclusions to weigh against the
practical record of real-world environmental agreements. The literature shows that nations can
reach superior outcomes through the use of coalitions and transfer payments. However, the most
efficient agreements require full cooperation. Free riding incentives abound in transboundary
pollution disputes, which prevent nations from sustaining full cooperative outcomes.

The Prisoner's Dilemma

Thaure 26

Let us begin with the simplest model of transboundary pollution. Two symmetrical
nations,

and , each have two action options: pollute or abate. Let us assume that pollution

between them is reciprocal; the benefits that each nation receives depends upon the other's
action. Furthermore, in keeping with general game theory assumptions, let us also assume that
both nations reveal their actions simultaneously and that each nation's payoffs and preference are
common knowledge. We may model this simple, reciprocal interaction as a classic prisoner's
dilemma. Figure 1.1 provides an example of a reciprocal transboundary pollution dilemma.
Payoffs are listed in the form

, where

denotes nation 's payoff and

denotes nation 's

payoff.
Consider the preferences of nation . If nation
response is to also pollute:
is still to pollute:

. If nation

decides to pollute, nation 's best
decides to abate, nation 's best response

. So, in both cases, nation

's best response to pollute. By the

rule of symmetry, nation 's best response is to pollute when nation

chooses to pollute or

abate. For both nations, regardless of the choice the other player makes, choosing to pollute
results in a higher payoff than choosing to abate.
Thus, the outcome that results from both nations' best responses is where both nations
choose to pollute. This is the Nash equilibrium: the combination of best responses such that no
nation has any incentive for a unilateral change in action.85 For nation
pollutes results in a worse outcome for

than the Nash equilibrium:

to abate while nation
. By the rule

of symmetry, neither nation benefits from choosing to abate when the other chooses to pollute.
So, the preferences of both nations reinforce the Nash equilibrium.
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Nation B

Nation A

Abate

Pollute

Abate

4,4

1,6

Pollute

6,1

3,3

Figure 1.1

However, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient. Both nations prefer the outcome where both
choose to abate:

for both nation

and . As such, the outcome where both

nations choose to abate improves upon the Nash equilibrium. The improvement is also Pareto
efficient: no nation is made worse off moving from the outcome
outcome

to

. In addition, the

maximizes aggregate payoffs. Let us refer to the outcome that maximizes

aggregate payoffs as the full cooperative outcome.
Though the full cooperative outcome improves upon the Nash equilibrium, it does not
constitute an equilibrium. Like most problems involving public goods and management of
resources held in common, this model of reciprocal transboundary pollution contains free-riding
incentives. Each nation prefers another outcome over the full cooperative outcome. For nation ,
. Similarly, for nation ,

. Either nation may reap additional benefits

by choosing to pollute while the other abates, encouraging each to deviate from the full
cooperative outcome. However, if both nations deviate from full cooperation by choosing to
pollute, then their payoffs simply revert to the inefficient Nash equilibrium. Though the full
cooperative outcome results in higher payoffs for both nations than the Nash equilibrium, freeriding provides an incentive to deviate and return to the Nash equilibrium. The incentive to break
away from full cooperation prevents it from being an equilibrium outcome.86
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Of course, unidirectional transboundary pollution does not conform to the reciprocal
model. Unidirectional pollution occurs when "transboundary pollution between two states moves
in the same direction. State A always sends pollution in the direction of State B[.]" (Merrill.
1997.) Nations engaged in a problem of unidirectional transboundary pollution are not
symmetric. The victim nation does not have the option to engage in the polluting activity itself;
its action set remains empty. Instead, the victim nation's payoff rests entirely on the decision of
the source nation. Assuming, as in the previous example, that the benefit to polluting is higher
than the benefit to abatement, the source nation prefers to pollute. Negotiating unidirectional
transboundary pollution, then, is a "cooperator's loss" game: cooperation makes the source state
worse off than noncooperation.87 There are no collective gains from abatement, since only the
source nation has the option to undergo abatement. As such, pollution and noncooperation is the
preferred strategy of source nations.
Does communication between nations play any role? Nations involved in a transboundary
pollution problem that can communicate with each other have potential to develop institutional
arrangements that change payoff parameters, thus changing preferences. Employing a transferof-gains mechanism, a institutional arrangement that redistributes payoffs, is one such method.
For example, both nations in a prisoner's dilemma may agree to impose fines on any nation that
free-rides by choosing to pollute while the other abates.88 The fine can then be awarded to the
nation that abates to encourage their commitment.
Figure 1.2 presents an adjustment of the earlier prisoner's dilemma example whereby
and

communicate with each other and agree to a transfer payment of

from any nation that

pollutes while the other abates. The payment is then awarded to the nation that abates. This
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Nation B

Nation A

Abate

Pollute

Abate

4,4

4,3

Pollute

3,4

3,3

Figure 1.2

transfer payment changes the payoff parameters of outcomes, along with the preferences of each
nation. Consider the preferences of nation
pollute, the best response of nation
best response of nation

under this arrangement. If nation

is to abate:

is also to abate:

. If nation

decides to

decides to abate, the

. So, nation 's best strategy is to abate

in either case. By the rule of symmetry, nation 's best strategy is to abate in either case that
chooses to pollute or abate. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is where both nations choose to abate.
With this transfer arrangement, the Nash equilibrium constitutes the full cooperative outcome.
The change in parameters eliminates free-rider incentives, prompting both nations to choose to
abate for the sake of optimization. So, with a transfer-of-gains mechanism, the full cooperative
outcome may be sustained.
Though institutional arrangements can change payoff parameters, they do no good unless
arrangements are binding between nations.89 Primarily, agreements need a mechanism that
allows participants to monitor each other to determine when free-riding occurs. Secondly,
nations must commit to carrying out the institutional arrangements they agree upon. Monitoring
alone only allow nations to unilaterally respond to each other's actions. Nations need to go above
monitoring and commit to fulfilling the agreement in order to sustain parameter changes.
Without credible commitments or an enforcement mechanism, nations may simply enter into
agreements they have no intention of honoring or refuse to honor commitments when they
89
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conflict with self-interest, ultimately nullifying the parameter changes an agreement aims to
impose.
Problems of monitoring and enforcement call into question the extent to which nations
comply with institutional arrangements. Nations stand to gain from either refusing to honor
commitments or defecting from an agreement, seeking the original payoffs offered by freeriding. Though institutions may change the parameters of a prisoner's dilemma, any nation that
seeks to free-ride also prefers the original parameters. A free-rider may reinstate those
parameters by simply refusing to fulfill commitments. Even with the parameter changes in the
earlier example, each nation prefers to free-ride and provide no transfer payment to the other and
return the game to the original parameters. Thus, institutional arrangements are not selfenforcing. By consequence, nether is the full cooperative outcome they hope to enforce.
Nevertheless, even without monitoring or enforcement mechanisms, transfer payments
still provide a useful incentive, especially for unidirectional transboundary pollution problems.
The use of a transfer-of-gains mechanisms allows us to model unidirectional pollution as a
prisoner's dilemma by expanding the action set of the victim nation. Let us assume that two
nations,

and , are involved in a unidirectional transboundary pollution problem. The source

nation, , has the action options: pollute or abate. The victim nation, , has the action options:
transfer payment, no payment. Essentially,

has the option to offer

a payment to encourage

abatement. With the potential to receive a transfer payment that compensates for the costs of
abatement, the source nation now has an incentive to cooperate.90
Figure 1.3 presents a prisoner's dilemma for unidirectional transboundary pollution with
the nations and action sets discussed above. The general outcome of unidirectional pollution is
90
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Nation V
No
Transfer Transfer
Nation S

Pollute

4,-5

2,-3

Abate

3,-2

1,0

Figure 1.3

where

pollutes and

offers no transfer payment. If the potential transfer payment is set to ,

the model operates like a prisoner's dilemma. Though
a loss, the outcome where

abates and

general outcome. Even though

s payoff in most outcomes still results in

provides a transfer is a Pareto improvement from the

still receives a negative payoff, both

and 's payoffs

nonetheless improve.
However, the model does not overcome the fundamental problems of a prisoner's
dilemma. 's best response is still to pollute in either case that

offers payment or no payment;

the general outcome of a unidirectional game, pollute and no payment, is the Nash equilibrium.
In addition, the transfer payment also contains free-riding incentives for both parties.
pollute while receiving transfers from :
transfer payment while

undergoes abatement:

. Likewise,

prefers to

prefers to offer no

. So, similar free-rider problems

that arise in reciprocal models also arise with a transfer of gains mechanism in the unidirectional
model.
The prisoner's dilemma model offers a wealth of explanatory power concerning the
fundamental conflicting interests involved in transboundary pollution. Nations benefit from
cooperation on abatement, but self-optimization compels nations to pollute. In addition, nations
have stronger incentives to free-ride on the abatement efforts of others rather than undergo
abatement themselves.
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The N-Nation Pollution Model

Though the prisoner's dilemma provides simple and intuitive insight, it lacks most of the
complex dimensions that characterize transboundary pollution. The most glaring oversight of the
prisoner's dilemma model is that most transboundary pollution involve more than two nations.
Multiple nations can alter free-riding incentives. How does the analysis change when more
nations are introduced?
The N-nation pollution game, as outlined in Barrett 1997, explores the same tensions
involved in the prisoner's dilemma across more than two parties. Suppose that there are
symmetrical nations involved in a transboundary pollution problem. All nations have the action
set: pollute or abate. The benefits of abatement depend on collective abatement effort. Any
nation benefits not only from their own abatement efforts, if they engage in any, but also the
abatement efforts of other nations. Let

be the number of nations that opt to abate (

be the payoff function for polluting nations, and

,

be the payoff function for abating nations.

We may model the payoff structure presented in the introductory prisoner's dilemma example.
To model the payoffs of Figure 1.1, the payoff functions are

A nation that chooses to pollute receives the benefit of economic gains wrought by the polluting
activity

plus any benefits from the abatement efforts of other countries

nation bears the cost of abatement

. An abating

but reaps the gains from its own abatement efforts

as well as the abatement efforts of other nations

.

,
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The same preference dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma operate in this N-nation
example. For any nation , regardless of the value of , the payoff to polluting is always higher
than the payoff to abatement. Because nation 's decision to abate or pollute affects , nation 's
payoff functions are

or

Hence, any nation always receive a higher payoff from choosing to pollute, regardless of the
choices of other nations. Thus, the Nash equilibrium of this example is for all countries to choose
to pollute.
In the aggregate, though, payoffs are maximized across all nations when all nations
engage in abatement. Aggregate net benefits, , are simply the sum of payoffs wrought by
polluting nations and abating nations:

We can demonstrate that the outcome where all nations abate is the full cooperative outcome.
Simplifying

yields the following:

If all nations abate, then

and

. Any other combination of strategies that

does not involve all nations choosing to abate involves at least one nation that chooses to pollute.
In any case where at least one nation chooses to pollute,
holds true:

. When

, the following
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Hence, when all nations choose to abate, aggregate benefits are always larger than any other
combination of strategies that involve at least one nation choosing to pollute. The full
cooperative outcome, then, requires that all nations choose to abate.
On the other hand, each nation maximizes their individual payoff by choosing to pollute.
Though full cooperation leads to higher payoffs across all nations, all nations prefer the payoff to
polluting over abatement. Essentially, this N-nation pollution example demonstrates the same
tensions as its corresponding prisoner's dilemma. Free-riding incentives do not allow full
cooperation to constitute an equilibrium point. Without binding commitments to abatement,
nations revert to the inefficient Nash equilibrium.
However, different parameter values in an N-nation pollution game can result in
equilibria whereby either all countries commit to the full cooperative outcome or a handful of
countries commit to abatement while others continue to pollute. Suppose that payoff functions
are

91

Figure 1.4 graphs these two functions together, with the x-axis measured by
measured by individual payoffs. The functions intersect at the point

and the y-axis

. The equilibrium of

this example is for five nations to abate and the rest to pollute. Past the point where five nations
abate, the payoff to polluting exceeds the payoff to abatement. So, any additional nations, in a
situation where five nations commit to abatement, receive a higher benefit from polluting. Just as
in the earlier example, the full cooperative outcome maximizes aggregate net benefits.
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Figure 1.4

However, in this case, a handful of nations experience higher individual payoffs by choosing to
abate. By these parameters, at most 5 prefer to abate. Thus, there are equilibria in N-nation
pollution models that involve nations undergoing abatement.
In fact, given certain parameters, the full cooperative outcome can constitute an
equilibrium. Suppose that the payoff functions from the earlier example are reversed:

As in the earlier example, these functions intersect at the point

. But in this case, if there

are less than 5 nations, all of them choose to pollute. If there are more than 5 nations, all nations
choose to abate. Thus, if

, the full cooperative outcome is the equilibrium.

Equilibria in N-nation pollution models that involve some, or all, countries undergoing
abatement are individually self-enforcing. For example, with parameters set forward in Figure
1.4, the equilibrium is for five nations to abate and for any additional nations to pollute. If any of
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the five polluting nations were to defect from abatement, choosing to pollute, that nation would
receive a lower individual payoff. Similarly, if any polluting nation decided to abate while five
nations were already committed to abatement, that nation would receive a lower individual
payoff as well. Hence, there can be self-enforcing arrangements of abatement. Though the model
does not indicate which nation will decide to abate, nations that choose to abate do so for the
sake of self-optimization.
Unidirectional transboundary pollution, on the other hand, does not conform to the Nnation pollution model. Unidirectional transboundary pollution rarely involves more than a
handful of nations. In addition, not all nations involved get to choose between polluting or
abatement. However, with more victims comes the opportunity to provide higher transfers. Also,
victims may choose to provide transfers to a handful of source states, receiving partial pollution
relief. Nonetheless, the same free-rider problems occur regardless of the number of nations
involved. The N-nation pollution model offers little additional insight into understanding
unidirectional transboundary pollution.

Barrett's Model of Environmental Agreements

Restrictive assumptions still hold back the N-nation pollution model. For instance, most
nations are not given a simple choice between pollution and abatement. Rather, nations select a
level of abatement to engage in with respect to the actions of others and abatement costs. We can
use the model developed in Barrett 1997 to treat abatement as a continuous variable.92 Assume
that there are

symmetrical nations that take their actions simultaneously. All nations have the

option to choose a level of abatement from a continuous spectrum of real numbers greater than
92
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zero. Instead of two separate payoff functions, let
. Benefits,
definition,
undergoes:

be the payoff function for nation , where

, are a function of the aggregate abatement, , taken by all
. Costs,

nations. By

, are a function of the quantity of abatement that nation

. The payoff function for any nation is simply the difference between the benefits

it receives from global abatement and the costs of its own abatement efforts:

Optimization requires that nation undergo a quantity of abatement
Taking the first derivative of

with respect to

that maximizes

.

yields the following:

Maximizing this equation, and taking into consideration that

, yields the following

condition:

Essentially, nations engage in abatement up to the point where marginal benefits to abatement
equal marginal costs. Hence, nation selects an abatement level

that maximizes its individual

total benefits.
In the full cooperative outcome, each nation commits to a level of abatement that
maximizes aggregate net benefits. Let

be the aggregate payoff function, where

.

The payoff function takes the following form:

Taking the derivative of

with respect to

following maximization condition:

and setting that derivative equal to zero yields the
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Essentially, full cooperation requires that every nation engage in abatement up to the point where
aggregate marginal benefits equal individual marginal costs.
Like the previous models explored so far, Barrett's model demonstrates the same tensions
of cooperation. The full cooperative outcome results in the highest aggregate payoffs. However,
under full cooperation, the marginal benefits to aggregate abatement are larger than individual
marginal benefits (by the constant

). Hence, no nation is individually optimized under full

cooperation. Each nation has an incentive to disregard the benefits of full cooperation in pursuit
of higher individual benefits. Under a situation of full cooperation, each nation gains by
defecting from cooperation, instead producing a quantity of abatement that maximizes their
individual payoff function. So, full cooperation is unsustainable.
The benefit of Barrett's model is that it couches transboundary pollution strategies in the
familiar economic logic of marginal costs and marginal benefits. It allows us to view
transboundary pollution as a problem of economic decision-making, where, instead of discrete
actions, nations make decisions along a continuum of action. The tensions inherent in resolving
transboundary pollution problems, then, arise from differences between group marginal benefits
and individual marginal benefits. The group always stands to benefit from cooperation, but the
individual benefits more from pursuing their own rational optimization strategy.

Coalitions and Barrett's Self-Enforcing Agreement

In the full cooperative outcome, all nations commit to a level of abatement such that any
deviation by any single nation makes all other nations worse off. However, the full cooperative
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outcome does not constitute an equilibrium. Any nation receives a higher payoff by defecting
from full cooperation, producing instead a level of abatement that maximizes its individual
payoff.
In Barrett's model of environmental agreements, nations may undergo any level of
abatement they wish. In the full cooperative outcome, aggregate marginal benefits are higher
than individual marginal benefits by the number of participating nations. Suppose that, under a
situation of full cooperation, a single nation defects from the agreement and that the remaining
nations wish to maintain a cooperative outcome among themselves. The remaining nations may
commit to a level of abatement,

, that maximizes the new group's aggregate benefits. In this

case, aggregate marginal benefits among the group members are still larger than individual
marginal benefits (now by (

)). So, the group still benefits from maintaining a cooperative

outcome despite the free-riding behavior of the defector. Furthermore, any number of nations
may choose to cooperate among themselves and still maintain aggregate marginal benefits that
are higher than individual benefits. Hence, there is a rationale for nations to enter into coalitions,
in the absence of full cooperation, that attempt to maximize aggregate benefits among its
members.
Coalition theses have been introduced into transboundary pollution models to examine
cooperative behavior in the absence of full cooperation. However, just as with the full
cooperative outcome, coalitions encounter the same problem of free-riding. When individual
marginal benefits are lower than the coalition's aggregate benefits, nations have an incentive to
defect from the agreement. The introduction of coalitions does little to expand the analysis
without some criteria for stability.
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Coalitions need to satisfy two different conditions of stability: internal stability and
external stability.93 Coalitions are internally stable if no member of the coalition gains by
unilaterally withdrawing. On the other hand, coalitions are externally stable if no nation outside
of the coalition benefits by unilaterally conforming to the terms of the coalition, effectively
inviting themselves in. Barrett 1997 provides the conditions for internal and external stability in
accordance with his model: Let

be a coalition of nations attempting to maximize aggregate

benefits among themselves, where
is a member of the coalition (
a member of the coalition (

. Let
). Let

be the payoff function for any country

be the payoff function for any country
). A coalition

that

that is not

is stable if it satisfies the two different

conditions of stability:

Essentially,

requires that the payoff for coalition members must be greater than or equal to

the payoff of being outside the coalition in the case that a single coalition member defects. That
way, a defecting nation either makes themselves worse off or remains indifferent between
defection and commitment. Also,

requires that the payoff for nations outside of the coalition

must be greater than or equal to the payoff of coalition members with the addition of another
member. That way, a nation that unilaterally accedes to the coalition makes themselves worse off
or remains indifferent.
With these two conditions, Barrett forms a strategy for self-enforcing environmental
agreements, as shown in Barrett 1997, with the assumption that nations experience homogenous
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cost and benefit functions. Nonmembers simply pursue a strategy of individual optimization,
maximizing their payoff function:

where

is the quantity that maximizes total individual benefits. Coalition members, on the

other hand, seek to maximize aggregate benefits among themselves. The payoff function for a
coalition member takes the following form:

Differentiating with respect to

results in the following:

Maximization requires

The operators

and

are each equal to one. Consider the value of

, how

the quantity of abatement undertaken by nonmembers changes with respect to a change in
abatement by members. Obviously, if all countries commit to the coalition (

), then

and the solution simply conforms to the full cooperative outcome. At the same time,
Barrett's model is built on the assumption of simultaneous moves. Nonmembers lack any
opportunity to react to the decision of the coalition members. So, taken as a reaction
specification,

.

Of course, if coalitions operate no differently than the full cooperative outcome,
coalitions offer no expanded analysis of cooperation. Barrett drops the assumption of
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simultaneous moves to view

as a specification that guides the decision of coalition members.

Implicitly, this new assumption allows the coalition to move first in a Stackelberg fashion.94
Through taking their action first, coalition members know the optimization strategy of
nonmemebers—maximize

—and can choose

such that they would find no benefit from

revising their abatement decisions after observing nonmember abatement decisions.95 Barrett
defines

as follows:

Substituting this back into the earlier equation results in the maximization condition for a selfenforcing environmental agreement:

Essentially, coalition benefits depend not only on the number of nations participating in the
coalition, but also on the number of nonmembers and the rates of marginal benefits and marginal
costs. Whether marginal benefits and marginal costs are increasing, decreasing, or constant,
plays a significant role in coalition benefits because second-order derivatives are involved in the
maximization condition.
Is Barrett's assumption of a first-moving coalition justified? The assumption remains
entirely exogenous to the model and argues for an asymmetry of information.96 Nevertheless,
nations must agree to form a coalition before taking their collective actions because the coalition
94
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strategy depends on the number of nations joining; implicitly, there is some dimension of
sequentially involved in coalition formation. In a game with sequential moves, the idea of a selfenforcing coalition only makes sense if the coalition moves first. A second-moving coalition
would have to contend with nonmembers who anticipate the coalition's abatement contributions
and adjust their strategies accordingly before the coalition moves. Nonmembers then take the
expected abatement of the coalition as given and engage in less abatement themselves, defeating
the logic of forming a coalition in the first place. In addition, a first-moving coalition does not
necessarily conflict with practical experience. For example, Scandinavian countries jointly
committed to high levels of acid rain abatement before the LRTAP's controls became legally
binding.97
In order to determine the number of nations that comprise a self-enforcing environmental
agreement, functional specifications for costs and benefits must be made.98 However, with
specifications, the model is no longer general. Benefits and costs depend in part upon the rate of
environmental assimilation of a given pollutant, which varies drastically between different types
of transboundary pollution. A choice of assimilation behavior changes the outcomes of a
transboundary pollution model.99 Using his own specifications, Barrett 1994 conducts a series of
simulations for games involving the formation of self-enforcing coalitions with the assumption
that

. He finds that the size of self-enforcing coalitions depends more on the ratio of

costs and benefits than on their values themselves.100 Thus, when the marginal benefits to
abatement are high (marginal environmental damage is high) relative to abatement costs, selfenforcing agreements consist of many nations. However, though self-enforcing agreements
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always improve upon level of abatement that takes place in a noncooperative outcome, they do
not offer substantial improvements given most parameters.101
Barrett's findings align with the other papers that discuss self-enforcing agreements and
coalitions. Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 find that coalitions tend to be small regardless of the
number of nations involved in a transboundary pollution game. Hoel 1992, instead of using the
concept of a coalition, models an agreement where a group of countries commit to abatement
under the condition that they are no worse off than under noncooperation. Under this constrained
social optimum, he finds that few countries can be expected to participate and that coalitions
only result in a modest increase in abatement. Rubio and Ulph 2006 presents an analysis inspired
by Barrett's model with the explicit additional assumption of non-negative emissions. Even with
non-negative constraints, self-enforcing agreements may be as large as full cooperation or as
small as two or three countries depending on benefits to abatement (environmental damages).
Though self-enforcing coalitions improve upon the non-cooperative outcome, they do not
solve the commitment problem inherent with free-riding incentives; the success of a coalition
still depends on commitment from its members. Though self-enforcing coalitions are stable in
the sense that no nation inside the agreement gains from leaving and no nation outside the
agreement gains from joining, all nations still have an incentive to remains uncooperative, since
nonmember countries gain through free-riding on the abatement efforts of coalition members.102
Consider a case where

) countries form a coalition. The coalition becomes self-enforcing

when one more nations joins in. However, the nations that decide against joining the coalition
each benefit more than the nation that joins the coalition. The nations that abstain from joining
the coalition gain free-riding benefits from the abatement efforts of the joining nation. All the
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nations that decide against joining the coalition receive the benefits of the stable coalition while
only the nation that joins bears the costs. Yet, if no nation joins, then all nonmembers are worse
off. Hence, the decision for players to join a self-enforcing coalition takes the form of a game of
chicken.103 Furthermore, Barrett's model of self-enforcing environmental agreements explicitly
assumes that compliance within the agreement is full, even though there is no mechanism
inherent in the coalition to ensure that each member undergoes abatement exactly at the efficient
level of

.104

Transfer Payments to Expand Coalitions

A coalition may attempt to expand its membership base by offering nonmembers a
transfer payment in exchange for entry into the coalition. Essentially, a coalition may reap higher
benefits by offering transfer payments to induce nonmembers to commit to

instead of

.

Such transfer payments must be self-financed in the sense that coalition members gain more in
abatement benefits than they lose in transfer payments.105
Depending on the types and levels of transfer payments involved, a coalition may expand
its membership even up to achieving the full cooperative outcome in the form of a grand
coalition. Assuming that a coalition simply makes self-financed, lump-sum payments to new
members that cover their individual losses, full cooperation may be achieved if 60% of involved
nations are part of the original coalition.106 Or, a coalition can tie transfer payments directly to
additional abatement efforts from nonmembers above what they produce in a Nash equilibrium.
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This is the grand stable coalition thesis, advanced by Chander and Tulkens 1995 and Tulkens
1997. The grand stable coalition thesis views coalitions as a cooperative option given to all
nations. A grand coalition that incorporates all nations provides a higher aggregate benefit than
any other coalition; it is the full cooperative outcome. Members of the grand coalition, to ensure
all nations adhere to the agreement, make transfer payments to cover the costs of additional
abatement from nonmembers. Through a formulaic approach, the grand coalition can ensure that
the costs of transfer payments and aggregate abatement costs are shared collectively among all
parties.107 Combined with the threat of coalition members disbanding the agreement entirely,
committing to

if nonmembers do not change their abatement behavior, all countries enter into

the grand coalition and the full cooperative outcome occurs.108
Just as with transfer payments in the unidirectional prisoner's dilemma, transfer payments
by coalitions require commitment from both members and nonmembers. Though transfer
payments preserve the profitability of coalitions, they create instability. 109 Without commitment,
coalition members can attempt to back out of transfer payments, free-riding on payments
financed by other coalition members. Alternatively, members outside of the coalition may simply
take transfer payments without fulfilling additional abatement commitments. The grand stable
coalition thesis especially relies on commitment between coalition members, not just on transfer
payments but also the threat of playing

against defectors. Nations remaining committed to the

coalition may simply renegotiate the agreement to maximize benefits among themselves instead
of embracing an undesirable outcome from playing
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self-enforcing mechanism and therefore lack stability despite their potential for encouraging
cooperation.

Dynamic Games

So far, the game theory analysis presented here has only covered static games.
Essentially, the models have been one-shot deals, where nations, though they can communicate
beforehand and collude to form coalitions, ultimately settle on one path of action in a single
round of decision-making. Noticeably, these games lack any dimension of time. Most real world
environmental agreements and their negotiations play out over time and often involve changing
control strategies in their later stages, like the Montreal Protocol. Furthermore, many agreements
lose and gain members as time progresses, changing the aggregate benefits that an agreement
results in and altering participation incentives.
Dynamic games introduce a time element that allows nations to consider strategies
throughout different strategic periods. Games may be either divided into discrete stages, with a
set number of rounds, or cover an infinite time horizon. To better capture the dynamics of realworld environmental agreements, this chapter will only focus on games with infinite time
horizons. Environmental agreements rarely have a set expiration date and are frequently revised,
re-enacted, and revived. Furthermore, transboundary pollution in the real world does not
conform to discrete time horizons. Even after a discrete time horizon, nations can simply return
to emitting individually rational levels of pollution. The tensions to engage in transboundary
pollution remain eternal to the problem. So, real-world environmental agreements are better
modeled through the application of an infinite time horizon.
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Dynamic games bring the advantage of allowing for the incorporation of stock pollutant
behavior: pollution damage that depends on the stock of pollutants in a given environment. Static
games treat pollution damage as an instantaneous flow, though many of the world's most
concerning pollutants display stock behavior.111 All of the agreements discussed in Chapter 1
dealt with stock pollutants, where scientists advocated for abatement with respect to measures of
critical environmental loads rather than general abatement. So, dynamic games that model stock
pollutants offer a better characterization of modern transboundary pollution problems than static
games.
However, the introduction of stock pollution damage changes the mode of analysis. With
stock pollution, not only are pollution flows important but also the assimilative capacity of the
environment. Barrett's model, though useful for general analysis, abstracts from pollution flows
by deeming abatement as the variable choice given to nations, not emissions. As such, we require
a model that allows nations variable control over their emissions levels and to consider pollution
stock.
Dynamic games with stock pollutants employ a motion equation that incorporates
pollution flow from all countries and the assimilative capacity of the environment, all as a
function of time. Missfeldt 1999 presents a general motion equation, replicated here:

where

is the stock of pollution,

the flow of pollution from nation as a function of time, and

the assimilation capacity of the environment as a function of the stock of pollution. Hence, the
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change in pollution stock at a given point depends on total emitted pollutants across all nations
minus natural assimilation.112
The benefits to any nation depend not only on pollution flows among nations
collectively, but also on the increase and decrease of pollution stock. We may employ our own
dynamic payoff function that works with motion equation displayed earlier. Let the payoff
function for any nation take the following form:

where

is the benefits of emitting pollution as a function of personal emissions

and

is the

damage caused by the total stock of pollution. Though the variable has changed from abatement
to emissions in this model, the fundamental payoff logic remains. Individual payoff depends on
the difference between benefits from personal emissions and damage from the stock of pollution
to which all nations contribute. However, payoff depends not only on other nations immediate
actions, but also on actions throughout time as the pollution stock increases and decreases.
Taking the first derivative of

which, by setting

with respect to

yields the following:

, can then be rearranged to reveal the maximization condition:

In each round of time, nations pollute to the point where individual marginal benefits of
emissions equal marginal damages from the pollution stock.
Just as in static games, full cooperation maximizes net benefits across all players. The
aggregate payoff function takes the following form:
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where

is the number of nations. Taking the derivative of

with respect to

and solving for

the maximization condition yields the following:

Under full cooperation, nations pollute in each round to the point where individual marginal
benefits of emissions equal aggregate marginal damages from the pollution stock.
Yet, damages remain unclear without a specification for

: the change in pollution stock

with respect to a change in individual emissions. Under both noncooperation and full
cooperation,

in turn depends on a specification for the assimilation function. Though nations

directly contribute to pollution stock, their additions also affect environmental assimilation
capacity. Commonly throughout most instances of transboundary pollution, higher levels of
pollution stock reduce assimilation capacity. So, as nations continue to increase pollution stock,
damages increase disproportionately because assimilation capacity reduces. Nonetheless, a
functional specification for environmental assimilation capacity is needed to clarify the extent of
damage.
However, providing a functional specification for environmental assimilation poses
problems for this general analysis. The outcomes of stock pollution control models are sensitive
to the choice of assimilation function.113 For example, in the context of greenhouse gases,
assimilation of pollutants cannot be approximated by a linear function, although many models
attempt to do so.114 Likewise, the assimilation of greenhouse gases differs from the assimilation
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of ozone-depleting substances or pollutants that contribute to acid rain. Non-linear specifications
lead to entirely different outcomes than linear specifications, with the possibility of multiple
equilibria.115 Thus, the fact that environmental assimilation differs between pollutants renders the
construction of a general model counterintuitive. Attempting to construct a general model with a
functional specification for environmental assimilation would only skew the analysis towards a
certain characterization of pollutants.
Unlike static games, dynamic games reach different Nash equilibria depending on
assumptions governing the availability of information. The most widely discussed modes of
Nash analysis in the context of dynamic pollution games are open-loop information structures
and feedback information structure.116 Under an open-loop information structure, nations only
know the initial value of pollution concentration and variables. No nation can adjust their
behavior because each lacks the knowledge of current pollution levels. So, nations commit
indefinitely to their initial strategies and take other nations' strategies as given.117 Under a
feedback information structure, nations observe the choices that other nations make through time
and the changing pollution stock, but not the initial value of pollution concentration. Feedback
Nash equilibria are also known as subgame perfect equilibria: they display strong time
consistency throughout successive rounds and subgames of the overall model.118 Technically, a
third concept exists, closed-loop information structures, that combines the information available
in both open-loop and feedback information structures. However, closed-loop analysis is not
normally undertaken in game theory models concerning transboundary pollution because it
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requires too much complexity.119 Nonetheless, Nash equilibria resulting from either open-loop or
feedback Nash equilibria are not Pareto efficient: cooperation leads to better aggregate payoffs
among players.120
Papers throughout the literature agree that feedback Nash equilibria result in higher
pollution stock—and therefore higher damages—than open-loop Nash equilibria.121 How does
access to present information result in a worse outcome? De Zeeuw 1998 offers a clear
explanation of the intuition:
Each country knows that in a feedback information structure, the other countries observe
the stock of pollutants and react to higher stocks with lower output and pollution.
Therefore, each country knows that an increase in output and pollution will then be partly
offset by a decrease in all the other countries.122
As the stock of pollutants increases, damages increase and nations respond by lowering
emissions to optimize their individual payoffs. At the same time, reduction among other nations
creates an incentive for any nation to increase their own emissions, knowing that other nations
offset their contributions. Alternatively, under a closed-loop information structure, nations
cannot observe developments in the pollutant stock. Thus, nations do not know the strategies of
other nations in response to higher pollution stocks.
Dynamic games also expand upon the theory of coalition formation by providing
opportunities for trigger mechanisms. In the static context, coalitions are maintained according to
internal and external stability. No member can gain by leaving the coalition, and nonmembers
cannot gain by unilaterally acceding to the coalition. However, in a dynamic context, nations
have the opportunity to react to defectors in later time stages. When a nation defects, coalition
members have the opportunity to punish the defector in future rounds by ending the coalition. If
119

Missfedlt. 1999.
Van de Ploeg and de Zeeuw. 1992.
121
Missfedlt. 1999.
122
De Zeeuw. 1998.
120

Thaure 53
the deviation of one nation leads to the coalition falling apart, defectors make themselves worseoff by ending the cooperative benefits that the coalition provides.123 So, if all coalition members
commit to a trigger strategy, following coalition controls when every member cooperates and
reverting to noncooperative emission levels when any nation defects, larger coalitions may be
sustained indefinitely.
However, there are three main issues with the use of trigger strategies. Firstly, the
incentive for nations to sustain a coalition through trigger strategies depends on the future value
discount rate of nations. In order to accurately represent economic preferences over an infinite
time horizon, the incorporation of a positive time preference is needed.124 In terms of dynamic
models, nations' strategies need to account for a preference for present benefits over future
benefits. Taking positive time preference into consideration, nations with a high discount rate
gain less from the use of trigger strategies. Those nations have less preference for sacrificing
present benefits for future gains. So, nations in a coalition only find trigger strategies desirable
provided that their future value discount rate is low.125
Secondly, trigger mechanisms run into the same problem of enforcement as transfer
mechanisms. While trigger mechanisms deter defection, they also hurt the coalition members
that undergo them. All players have an incentive to renegotiate the coalition and attempt
cooperation.126 Commitment is required to make trigger strategies credible, otherwise nations
may simply renegotiate a coalition when a member defects.
Furthermore, trigger mechanisms rely on a coalition's ability to monitor the actions of its
members. With many transboundary pollutants, sources do not always remain clear, nor do
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damages directly manifest after an increase in emissions. If deviations take time to detect, trigger
mechanisms are not likely to work.127 An effective monitoring mechanisms is required to keep
trigger threats credible.

Conclusions

Game theory models demonstrate that the best outcome for all nations, full cooperation,
is inherently unstable. Nations gain more from pursuing individual optimization strategies than
respecting the commitments required by full cooperation. Though full cooperation remains
unstable, opportunities to form coalitions and undergo transfer payments improve upon
noncooperative outcome in nearly all models presented in this chapter. Coalitions and transfer
payments, though, still require some basic level of commitment, as well as monitoring and
enforcement abilities. Even with coalitions and transfer payments, environmental agreements
cannot be expected to improve much upon what nations would already pursue in the absence of
an agreement.
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Chapter 3: Reconciling Game Theory with Practical Experience

Now that we have covered both game theory and real world environmental agreements,
we can place the two chapters into conversation with each other. This chapter posits seven
general arguments that support and critique conclusions from game theory, as well as point out
fundamental shortcomings and characteristics of real-world environmental agreements. This
chapter presents a unique contribution, as the literature on game theory and commentary on realworld environmental agreements rarely acknowledgement the views of each other.

The Behavior of Nations in Real-World Agreements Aligns Closer to Open-Loop Analysis than
Feedback Analysis

Static game theory models provide useful insights into strategic behavior without the
burden of complexity. However, static models also lack any sort of time dimension. Though
static games may be expanded into games with discrete stages or time intervals, real-world
environmental agreements operate under an indefinite time schedule. Though signatories may
agree upon expiration dates for agreements, like with the Kyoto Protocol, transboundary
pollution problems do not end with agreements or protocols. As long as free-rider incentives
exist to benefit nations that engage in pollution, nations may simply return to polluting after the
end of an agreement.
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Thus, the tensions of cooperation remain ever-present with transboundary pollution
problems in the real world. Agreements and control schedules often take decades to discuss,
implement, and oversee. Also, signatories periodically revise agreements to account for changes
in technology and pollution stock. For example, the Montreal Protocol has undergone multiple
revisions over its lifetime and remains a binding international agreement even today.128
Considering the lifespan of real-world environmental agreements and the perpetual problem
posed by transboundary pollution, signatories to an environmental agreement need to formulate
their strategies in a dynamic context with a near-infinite time horizon in order to achieve
efficient outcomes.
However, as reviewed in the dynamic games section of Chapter 2, information
assumptions change the analysis and outcomes of dynamic models. Though most models assume
that nations know the costs and benefits of pollution and abatement, analyses differ with regard
to available information on pollution stock and player strategies. This forms the crux of the
dichotomy between open-loop and feedback information structures: open-loop analysis assumes
that nations only know initial parameters and commit to initial strategies indefinitely, as they
cannot view changes in other nations' behavior or the pollution stock, while feedback analysis
assumes that nations only know present changes in pollution stock and others nations' responses
to those changes.
Which one aligns closer to reality, open-loop or feedback analysis? Though feedback
analysis remains theoretically useful because of its strong time consistency,129 its assumption of
access to present information remains unrealistic. Most environmental agreements and
negotiations take place in a vacuum of present information. Both the Montreal Protocol and
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LRTAP created their own scientific institutions to rectify the lack of scientific development,
consensus, and understanding at the time. Furthermore, access to present information requires a
monitoring ability that has yet to be established for many transboundary pollutants. Most of the
greenhouse gases that Kyoto attempted to control had no reliable monitoring potential at the time
the agreement was put forward.130 Even in situations where models can be developed, models
nonetheless take time and resources to develop. These form transaction costs that feedback
analysis often ignores, even though transaction costs present significant obstacles for access to
present information in the real-world.
Secondly, feedback analysis assumes that nations easily adjust their emissions in
response to new information. In reality, an abundance of uncontrollable factors affect pollution
emissions that inhibit flexibility once a nation commits to an emission strategy. For example,
greenhouse gas emissions vary with economic growth and technological change, neither of
which can be accurately planned by governments.131 Furthermore, energy infrastructure, often
directly responsible for most of a nation's pollution emissions, does not lend itself to flexible
adjustments. Energy infrastructure takes time to develop, plan, renew, or replace, often over
decades. For example, four-fifths of the power plants expected to operate in 2010 were already in
operation or under construction by the time of Kyoto's negotiation.132 The United States had
already committed to infrastructure that complicated the scheduled reductions imposed by
Kyoto. Given these real-world inflexibilities, nations have little immediate ability to alter the
course of their emission trends.
Given the inflexibilities and transaction costs associated with present information, realworld agreements align closer with open-loop analysis than feedback analysis. Most
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environmental agreements operate on the basis of an initial set of commitments that nations must
fulfill over a schedule. The Montreal Protocol, LRTAP, and Kyoto, all committed signatories to
reduce pollution with respect to a past baseline. Signatories to real-world agreements are not
given the option to alter commitments in response to the behavior of other signatories. Again,
given inflexibilities and transaction costs, signatories bear little ability to alter their initial
strategies anyway. Therefore, open-loop analysis bears more practical value than feedback
analysis.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, there is general agreement throughout the game theory
literature that open-loop Nash equilibria result in better outcomes (less pollution stock) than
feedback Nash equilibria. Under a feedback information structure, nations observe how others
reduce their emissions as pollution stock increases. So, all nations have an incentive to free-ride
on the abatement of others and increase their own emissions. Without the ability to view present
information or strategies under an open-loop information structure, nations cannot make the
observations that leads to the free-riding behavior that occurs under feedback information
structures. Instead, nations acting under an open-loop information structure commit to an initial
strategy based only on initial information. So, even if real-world environmental agreements only
result in noncooperative outcomes, they nonetheless achieve better outcomes than feedback
analysis predicts.

Game Theory Models Lack Dimensions of Trust Linkage that are Critical to International
Negotiations.
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Game theory models assume that homo economicus forms the basis of modern statecraft:
nations' primary motivation in negotiations is the maximization of self-gain, even at the cost of a
breakdown in negotiations. However, homo economicus clashes with the delicacies of modern
statecraft. Though certain agreements and negotiations may be one-shot games, behavior in a
broad international context needs to account for trust linkages and diffuse reciprocity:
Questions of treaty compliance arise in an environment of diffuse reciprocity, with
manifold opportunities for subtle expressions of displeasure, suspicion, and reluctance to
deal with treaty-violators in other contexts. A reputation for unreliability cannot be
confined to the area of activity in which it is earned. It is inevitable that a state's defection
from treaty rules will generate repercussions and linkages throughout the network of its
relationships with others in the community.133
Diffuse reciprocity is the idea that nations expect other nations to conform to generally accepted
standards of behavior in international relations and negotiations.134 As Chayes and Chayes 1991
argues, nations often approach treaty compliance as a generally accepted standard of
international conduct. Nations that engage in noncompliance or defect from a treaty threaten
their bargaining ability in other international agreements when members of the international
community label and shun untrustworthy states. Though maximizing self-gain remains a
fundamental motivation, nations must also consider the reputation they establish in the
international sphere to maximize self-gain in the long run and across all international treaties and
agreements they participate in. Therefore, game theory models underestimate nations' proclivity
for cooperation in international contexts.
Of course, reputation concerns may also prompt states towards aggressive negotiation or
stubborn refusals of commitments. It may pay for a country to remain incalcitrant and bargain
down commitments in initial rounds of negotiations to gain a reputation as a tough negotiator.135
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Nevertheless, such behavior cannot escape the pressure of diffuse responsibility. Even though
signatories may seek out tough negotiation positions, noncompliance and stubborn behavior has
trust consequences. So, once an agreement becomes settled, diffuse responsibility pressures
nations to commit.

The Centralization and Support of Scientific Research is Central to the Vitality of Agreements.

Another problematic assumption incorporated into game theory models is perfect
information, that all involved parties have access to all information regarding the costs and
benefits of pollution and abatement. None of the real-world agreements examined in this project
were formed under circumstances of perfect information. In fact, many of these agreements were
enacted during periods of weak scientific understanding. The early iterations of both the
Montreal Protocol and LRTAP had no controls on pollution. Instead, they only committed
parties to support scientific research and development. LRTAP created the European Monitoring
and Evaluation Program (EMEP) and tasked it with harmonization and evaluation of emission
data, as well as the development of common methodologies and pollutant modeling.136 The
Vienna Convention, the precursor to the Montreal Protocol, empowered UNEP to conduct
working groups of scientific and engineering experts.137 In turn, the Montreal Protocol developed
its own dedicated scientific assessment panel.138
Dedicated scientific institutions within both regimes developed the information necessary
to administer effective pollution controls. These institutions provided concerted scientific efforts
to overcome coordination problems with data management. In addition, they advanced the
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implementation of controls based on scientific understanding of pollutant behavior. Under the
Montreal Protocol, scientists developed the standardized metric "ozone-depletion potential" to
regulate emissions and focus early efforts on the most damaging targeted compounds.139
Similarly, EMEP harmonized research methods and rationalized controls around critical-load
analysis.140 Thus, these regimes internally developed the information necessary to account for
pollution damages and gradually adjusted control schemes to operate under a scientific basis.
Furthermore, scientific institutions enhanced these regimes by providing an effective
monitoring capability. Harmonized data allowed regulatory bodies to make comparable
environmental quality assessments between signatories,141 as well as to ensure that signatories
followed through with their commitments. In addition, though both the Montreal Protocol and
LRTAP relied on self-reported data, scientific analysis proved capable of identifying and
deterring bogus data submissions. Munton et al. 1999 discusses evaluation capacity in the
context of LRTAP:
[The] collective emissions data, while relying on national reports, were considered highly
reliable because they were regularly evaluated by scientists in the context of the creation
of transport models. Erroneous national reports would have been detected in the course of
modeling because of the anomalous results they would have generated. In fact, there are
reports that the Czech government considered submitting false reports in the late 1980s,
but opted not to precisely because it believed that the subterfuge would be detected
through EMEP.142
EMEP's objective of creating a European-wide model of acid rain provided it with benchmarks
against which to compare self-reported data. Thus, scientific development endowed EMEP with
the ability to hold signatories accountable for the data they submitted. The Montreal Protocol's
scientific assessment panel provided a similar function, though data conflicts were mainly
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resolved by the Ozone Secretariat on an informal basis.143 Dedicated scientific institutions
provided a monitoring ability to ensure implementation of commitments.
Intriguingly, the support of scientific development spurred the transition of weak regimes
into strong regimes by bypassing and eliminating political deadlock. Again, the early iterations
of the Montreal Protocol and LRTAP contained no pollution controls: signatories only agreed to
support scientific development. However, once the science developed and signatories were made
aware of the extent of damages, signatories were pressured into accepting pollution controls in
both regimes. In the case of LRTAP, research solidified consensus and led countries to discover
domestic acid rain damage that had been previously unaccounted for.144 Discoveries of domestic
damage flipped many recalcitrant signatories into accepting LRTAP controls, including Austria,
Finland, Switzerland, the Netherlands,145 and Germany.146 In addition, EMEP allowed Eastern
European researchers to bypass their respective governments and submit data directly through
LRTAP, refuting denials of involvement in acid rain.147 Similarly, the United States shifted into
a strong leadership position for CFC controls after the signing of the Vienna Convention once
scientific consensus expanded.148 Though the United States was not necessarily shifted by the
Montreal Protocol's own scientific panels, those panels nonetheless drove international
negotiations through their stamp of legitimacy in the regime.149 Thus, scientific development
helped curtail political reservations to abatement commitments.
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Kyoto serves as a counterexample. While IPCC publications drove forward scientific
consensus,150 the institution was not dedicated to the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol
suffered from incomplete and unharmonized data as countries ignored the proposed common
framework and relied on their own nontransparent accounting methods.151 Furthermore, Kyoto
targeted pollutants that lacked practical scientific means of measurement or monitoring. When
Kyoto incorporated methane and nitrous oxide into its targeted gases, no reliable proxy measures
existed and emission factors, especially natural factors, varied widely.152 In fact, the Kyoto
Protocol had no reliable means to estimate or monitor greenhouse gases beyond carbon dioxide
emitted from traded fossil fuels.153 The lack of dedicated scientific input, review, and data
harmonization crippled Kyoto from rationalizing its controls or accurately accounting for the
emissions it sought to control.
On another note, the Montreal Protocol stands out among environmental regimes in its
establishment of internal technical advising panels. Made up of engineering experts, these panels
consulted with industries and services that relied on ozone-depleting substances, providing
technical options for substitutes and elimination. For example, input from technical panels led to
the development of essential-use exemptions for key industrial chemicals, avoiding complicated
implementation problems that might have otherwise discouraged signatories.154 Panels also
addressed the practical concerns and constraints necessary to reduce friction in the compliance
process.155 These panels provided a key link between the regime and technical constraints.
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Technical panels allowed the Montreal Protocol to promote abatement while avoiding painful
economic disruptions.
Yet, despite the success and experiences of the Montreal Protocol, most environmental
agreements are conducted in a complete vacuum of technical understanding. Neither LRTAP nor
Kyoto established technical panels, nor most international environmental agreements.
Understandably, regimes may remedy their ignorance of technical constraints and options
through cooperation with other institutions. Though LRTAP benefitted from EC mandated
reforms in automobile fuel efficiency and energy infrastructure, LRTAP failed to promote any
reassessments of technical or economic constraints among its signatories.156 Kyoto, on the other
hand, struggled to address all practical considerations, technical or otherwise. Kyoto's architects
reached no agreement on how flexibility instruments were to work, how sinks were to be
measured (if at all), or how the agreement was to be enforced until the Marraketch accords,157
after the infamous exit of the United States. The Protocol's arbitrary limitations on carbon sink
creation and accounting, as well as emission trading, placed daunting and uncertain cost burdens
on its signatories, especially the United States.158 Furthermore, Kyoto failed to flesh out the
procedures or instuitions for its own flexibility channels.159 Only years after Kyoto's approval did
signatories come to understand how mechanisms like the CDM or emission trading markets
would work. Initially, signatories entered into the agreement under utter confusion regarding
potential costs and implementation constraints.
So, environmental regimes stand to benefit from internal technical advisory bodies, as
well as internal scientific ones. When incorporated, these advisory bodies engage with
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signatories of environmental regimes to indentify low-cost abatement measures. Technical
advisory bodies also highlight infeasibilities in a regime's control measures, prompting internal
reassessment. Besides technical advisory bodies, internal scientific advisory bodies have proved
effect throughout international environmental regimes.160 Internal scientific bodies endow
regimes with the information necessary to rationalize abatement commitments as well as the key
ability to monitor commitments. Through monitoring comes the ability for a regime to identify
noncompliance and substantiate threats against it.

Transfer Payments Help Agreements Succeed, Though They are Seldom Applied.

Chapter 2 demonstrated how transfer payments can influence payoff parameters in both
unidirectional and reciprocal games, as well as broaden coalitions in both static and dynamic
games. Yet, the success of transfer payments rests on the assumption of commitment. Nations
must commit to carrying out transfer payments and receiving nations must commit to undergoing
abatement in exchange for those payments. Otherwise, nations on either side of the arrangement
bear the inventive to free-ride on the actions of the other.
In real-world agreements, transfer payments are uncommon.161 Most agreements rely on
targeted percentage reductions across all parties, regardless of costs, or employ differentiated
responsibilities for developing nations. Nonetheless, transfer payments have been successfully
employed in the Montreal Protocol to the benefit of all signatories. In addition, the pollution
dynamics of both LRTAP and Kyoto presented clear grounds for the implementation of transfer
programs.
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To review, the Montreal Protocol carries out a transfer payment program through the
multilateral fund. Through contributions from developed nations, the multi-lateral fund supplies
funding to developing nations for projects that implement the freeze and elimination of ozonedepleting substances. The multi-lateral fund employs simple safeguards to prevent free-riding:
funds are conditional upon project proposals that go through a review and approval process. The
multi-lateral fund also subcontracts with the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP for implementation
needs. That subcontracting arrangement provides for redundancy and utilizes existing resources
without creating new bureaucracy.162
The multi-lateral fund solved simple compliance problems primarily among developing
nations. During its first years of implementation, the Montreal Protocol struggled to collect data
from many of its signatories because developing nations lacked the institutional capacity to
produce necessary data sets.163 Hence, many multi-lateral fund projects ensured basic
compliance, keeping developing nations in the agreements as opposed to harassing them through
the noncompliance process. By keeping developing nations in the agreement, the multi-lateral
fund prevented leakage that would have undermined abatement efforts.
Multi-lateral fund projects have been implemented across the world and seen successful
results. From 1991 to 2012, nearly 2200 multi-lateral fund projects have been implemented
across 105 countries, resulting in the phase out of nearly 67,000 tons of ozone-depleting
substances.164 Many of these projects have addressed direct technical concerns in key commodity
industries in the developing world. UNDP champions the Montreal Protocol and multi-lateral
fund projects as "an example of integration of environmental and equity concerns while
promoting human development." (United Nations Development Program. 2012) The regime and
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all of its signatories have reaped immense gains towards the reduction of ozone-depleting
substances from this transfer program.
LRTAP had no transfer program despite the obvious potential such a program presented
at the time. Many countries with low abatement costs were directly upwind from sensitive
European ecosystems. Poland and Czechoslovakia, countries whose abatement costs were 80%
less than Western European countries, contributed a large percentage of Norway and Sweden's
acidification.165 Yet, LRTAP pursued uniform, self-financed reductions across Europe, which
varied widely in terms of costs. These reduction ignored the regional nature of acid rain
transmission and damages; some countries' emissions presented more of a transboundary threat
than others. A transfer payment scheme could have been arranged precisely to fund cheap
abatement among Europe's greatest contributors to acid rain.
Certainly, European nations, at the time of LRTAP's implementation, were aware of the
great potential that transfer payments presented because many nations decided to arrange their
own programs. European nations unilaterally and bilaterally engaged in a mix of uncoordinated
loans, grants, and assistance for acid rain abatement.166 Game theory scholars have also
commented on acid rain abatement in Europe and advocated for transfer payments: Kaitala et al.
1992 conducts a game theory model of acid rain between Finland and Russia, concluding that
Finland should have offered payments to Russia in exchange for abatement. Even still, without
centralized and concerted funding from LRTAP, many Eastern European nations struggled to
meet commitment. Though nearly all European nations achieved 30% reductions in sulfur
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dioxide by 1994, most Eastern European countries failed to meet the nitrogen oxide protocol or
volatile organic compounds protocol.167
Kyoto, on the other hand, made the bizarre decision to both allow for transfers to occur
through permit exchanges and excuse developing nations entirely from any pollution controls.
Developed countries sought to purchase abatement from developing nations to ease the burden of
their commitments. The United States determined its low compliance cost estimation on the
condition that it purchased 75% of its abatement overseas.168 Yet, despite the fact that they
offered cheap abatement options, developing nations were excluded from controls and unable to
participate in permit exchanges. The exclusion hampered the purchasing opportunities available
to developed nations. Though the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allowed developed
nations to engage in projects similar to those carried out by the Montreal Protocol's multi-lateral
fund, credit for CDM projects was arbitrarily capped by Kyoto and no recognition was given for
negative-carbon projects, such as the creation of new carbon sinks.169 Furthermore, institutions
and guidelines for the CDM and carbon-permit exchanges were not developed until long after the
exit of the United States. For years, signatories had no ability to forecast the use of these
institutions into their abatement plans.
The exclusion of developing nations dealt a critical blow to Kyoto. Whereas the Montreal
Protocol fostered the participation of developing nations, extending its controls globally, Kyoto
failed to regulate 40% of world emissions. Worse, the exclusion allowed developing nations to
increase their emissions, creating leakage. Even more puzzling is the fact that Kyoto was
inspired by the Montreal Protocol.170 According to Kyoto's architects, the exclusion of
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developing nations embodied a principle of common but differentiated responsibilities based on
the Montreal Protocol.171 However, the Montreal Protocol did not exclude developing nations. It
included developing nations while offering them financial relief through the multi-lateral fund.
Somehow, Kyoto's architects interpreted the Montreal Protocol's precedent as one of exclusive
responsibilities between developed and developing nations. That bastardized interpretation
prevented Kyoto from subjecting developing nations to controls or instituting a transfer payment
mechanism to encourage commitment.
The stakes of the Montreal Protocol perhaps explain why it remains one of the few
agreements that operates a transfer program. Signatories realized that full participation from
developing nations was necessary to prevent leakage.172 Nonetheless, even at the time Kyoto
settled on the exclusion of developing nations, it was clear that such exclusion doomed controls
to a modest impact on global warming.173 A transfer program could have rectified this obvious
oversight, yet none was formed because of the policy norm of exclusive responsibilities.
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, other currently active policy and legal norms
discourage the employment of transfer payments to resolve transboundary pollution. Even
despite the clear economic potential of transfer payments, nations do not consider transfer
payments viable when operating under these norms. Nevertheless, the Montreal Protocol
provides successful precedent for the use of transfer payments. LRTAP demonstrates that
transfer payments may even be employed outside of an agreement to generate regional benefits.
Transfer payments remain a practical policy tool that future agreements should consider to make
up for the failure of agreements like Kyoto.
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Soft Enforcement Mechanisms Have Found More Success than Hard Enforcement Mechanisms.

Intuitively, transboundary pollution regimes require enforcement mechanisms to ensure
that signatories carry out commitments. Otherwise, free-rider incentives motivate signatories to
either under-provide towards their commitments or, if they cannot avoid detection by monitoring
mechanisms, defect from the regime entirely. The success of a transboundary pollution regime
hinges on enforcement mechanisms that combat free-riding behaviors.
However, many transboundary pollution regimes have found more success with soft
enforcement mechanisms, like informal noncompliance procedures, non-dedicated review
bodies, and active negotiations, than hard enforcement mechanisms, like formal noncompliance
procedures and sanctions. In fact, few dispute resolution systems in environmental regimes are
invested with any significant resolution powers.174 Both the Montreal Protocol and LRTAP
advanced their goals with soft enforcement mechanisms. Soft enforcement mechanisms, though
weak, permit strong consensus-building powers, whereas strong mechanisms tend to generate
hostility among signatories and threaten the integrity of an environmental regimes.175
The Montreal Protocol serves as a better example of effective soft enforcement
mechanisms than LRTAP, since LRTAP owes much of its success to incidental changes and
motivations. The Montreal Protocol directly brought about compliance through soft enforcement
mechanisms. Though the Montreal Protocol included provisions for trade sanctions against
outsiders and noncompliant members, no formal sanctions were technically incorporated into the
compliance review process. Instead, the implementation committee sought to resolve
noncompliance problems on a relatively informal basis with linkages to other Protocol
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institutions. The implementation committee tackled problems of incomplete and missing data.
Work between the implementation committee and the multilateral fund provided technical and
financial assistance to developing nations for data reporting.176 Technical advising panels also
assisted Protocol signatories with data preparation, especially among nations of the former
Soviet Union.177 This facilitative approach worked with noncompliant nations to facilitate
resolution. In fact, all original noncompliance issues were submitted for review by the affected
parties themselves.178 Instead of aggravating noncompliant nations and prompting withdrawal
from the Protocol, informal processes addressed issues while ensuring for participation.
Of course, the Montreal Protocol's soft enforcement mechanisms did not achieve success
merely by themselves. Rather, they thrived through institutional synergies. The Montreal
Protocol had the advantage of multiple non-dedicated review bodies, such as its expert advisory
bodies, that provided the advantage of redundancy.179 In addition, the noncompliance process
was backed by powerful sticks and carrots: trade sanctions and multi-lateral fund respectively.180
Hence, the Montreal Protocol's soft enforcement mechanisms operated above a bedrock of
formal hard measures. At the same time, soft enforcement mechanisms need not form the only
enforcement mechanisms of an environmental regime. The Montreal Protocol's blend of soft and
hard enforcement mechanisms avoids unproductive antagonism while retaining the credible
threat of tough action to ensure cooperation.181
Nonetheless, many elements of soft enforcement mechanisms prove invaluable to
international environmental agreements. Soft enforcement mechanisms work through diffuse
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responses that lend themselves to cleaner calibration than formal sanctions.182 Also, soft
enforcement mechanisms harmonize with the many inherent uncertainties of treaty formation:
treaties, like all legal instruments, contain ambiguities because of unforeseen
circumstances, changing conditions or technology, or differences that were papered over
in the negotiation process. Disputes about compliance with treaties are therefore not
occasional departures from a steady state, but a continuing fact of life, as in any complex
legal regime.183
Again, all of the environmental agreements reviewed by this project were enacted during times
of underdeveloped scientific understanding. Without complete understanding, signatories enter
into environmental agreements without full knowledge of potential costs or consequences of
abatement procedures. Soft enforcement mechanisms ensure that regimes remain flexible enough
to deal with new developments or expected difficulties without punishing signatories for factors
beyond their control.
Therefore, considering the novelty of most transboundary pollution problems as they
arise, environmental agreements find more success with soft enforcement mechanisms. Utilizing
soft enforcement mechanisms as the first line of defense against noncompliance brings the
advantage of engagement without hostility. Yet, soft enforcement mechanisms may encounter
compliance problems too difficult to resolve. In that case, hard enforcement mechanisms may
prove necessary. A blend of both soft and hard enforcement mechanisms combines the best of
both approaches: the diffuse interactions of soft mechanisms and the tangible threats of hard
mechanisms. The Montreal Protocol demonstrates the feasibility of such a dual approach.

Most Agreements Achieve No More Than What Countries are Already Comfortable Committing
To.
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Throughout most international environmental agreements, signatories rarely commit to
abatement above and beyond their own desires without support mechanisms. Many agreements
enact weak controls that place signatories ahead of schedule. Some nations escape controls
entirely while remaining in a regime, while others only comply due to incidental changes in
energy policies, economic activity, or technology. Certainly, there are exceptions. The United
States bore two-thirds of Kyoto's cost burden and the Montreal Protocol carried out a successful
transfer payment program. However, as will be shown below, these exceptions prove the general
rule.
With the Montreal Protocol, the threat of environmental damage was high enough to
justify many of the bold maneuvers the Protocol took. Even still, nations were already ahead of
the first control requirements by the time they were enacted.184 Furthermore, previous ozonecontrol proposals had met with harsh industry backlash throughout the 1980s. The chemical
industry refused to accept the Montreal Protocol until profitable substitutes for CFCs were near
completion and its own scientists confirmed CFCs' threat to the ozone layer.185 Much of the
success of the Montreal Protocol stems from the fact that industry and powerful nations endorsed
it once controls were deemed economically feasible.186
With LRTAP, incidental reforms allowed most signatories to meet controls, like
European Commission directives:
Neither the [European Commission's] power plant directive nor the vehicle emissions
directives were motivated by transboundary concerns. In both cases, Germany adopted
strict national standards out of concern for its own forests, and sought to extend those
standards to other members to equalize the terms of economic competition. 187
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Critical energy policy reforms were mainly initiated at the EU level, not among signatories.
Neither the sulphur nor the nitrous oxide protocols motivate signatories to revise their domestic
emission-reduction policies.188 Furthermore, many European countries incidentally complied
with LRTAP by tackling domestic pollution problems that the regime helped them identify. As
covered previously, most of central Europe accepted controls once they discovered domestic
damages that abatement could alleviate. As such, European countries were poised to undergo
abatement, both deliberately and incidentally, regardless of LRTAP.
With Kyoto, all signatories, save for the United States, bargained for paltry reductions
against their baselines:
Indeed, many of the nations that accepted specified reductions actually promised to do
little or nothing beyond what had already been done as a result of economic
developments. Russia was given a target of 100% its 1990 emissions, but by 1997, its
actual emissions had already dropped to a mere 70% of that amount due to economic
difficulties...Germany appeared to accept a significant reduction—8% by 2012—but in
1997, its own emissions were already 10% lower than in 1990, as a result of reunification
with the former East Germany...For the United Kingdom...the target reduction of 8% was
less severe than it seemed, because in 1997, the United Kingdom was already at a level
5% below that of 1990.189
Economic difficulties in Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union had already set up most
European nations for compliance with Kyoto's commitments. Nonetheless, after the exit of the
United States, signatories at the Marraketch accords bargained for weaker commitments.190
While developed nations accepted little more than a freeze in emissions according to the 1990
baseline, developing nations won complete exemption from any controls whatsoever.
How can we interpret weak commitments in the context of game theory? Do weak
commitments mean that agreements only result in self-interested commitments, or are there at
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least self-enforcing coalitions at work within? The basic logic of coalition behavior is that some
nations may engage in abatement above their self-interest through collective behavior. Certainly,
that behavior manifests in real-world agreements. For example, Scandinavian nations unilaterally
committed to higher levels of acid rain abatement than other LRTAP signatories. At the same
time, those nations engaged in higher abatement due to technological advantage and higher
potential benefits from protecting sensitive ecosystems. Nations in the real world are not
homogenous, yet the game theory models in this project only considered homogenous nations.191
Nonetheless, the weak starting point of most agreements demonstrates that most countries accede
to agreements only on the condition that their commitments do not drastically conflict with their
self-interest.

Conclusions

Game theory models elucidate the conventional problems of cooperation associated with
transboundary pollution. However, their conclusions appear too dismal with respect to
cooperation. With real-world agreements, countries normally cooperate and commit to
agreements unless controls are wholly unfeasible. At the same time, the inability of real-world
agreements to push signatories towards full cooperation, in the sense of maximizing aggregate
benefits, aligns with the conclusions of game theory. Though countries cooperate with
international agreements, agreements usually affirm the commitments that countries would have
pursued anyway in the absence of an agreement.
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In addition, despite the success story of the Montreal Protocol, its unique circumstances
set it apart from other environmental regimes. The high benefits to CFC reduction propelled the
Montreal Protocol to encourage the development of substitutes for ozone-depleting substances,
hence its establishment of a technical advisory committee.192 What's more, the Montreal
Protocol's noncompliance mechanisms were never used to solve difficult compliance
problems.193 Though other environmental regimes struggle with data submission, basic
institutional support proves an easy remedy. Serious compliance problem, like failure to meet
control requirements or illicit trading of ozone-depleting substances, were never handled through
this compliance mechanism.
Furthermore, production of ozone-depleting substances was concentrated among a few
industrial actors in key nations.194 In the 1970s, the United States produced half of the worlds
CFCs, and DuPont alone produced half of the United State's total.195 Only a handful of other
production operations existed, most of them concentrated in Europe and Japan.196 Hence, ozonedepleting substances were a relatively simple transboundary pollution problem in terms of
pollution sources, whereas other transboundary pollution problems, like acid rain and greenhouse
gases, have multiple complex sources for regulators and noncompliance procedures to consider.
Despite all its brilliant design and innovative arrangements, the Montreal Protocol
nonetheless bore the unique advantage that both signatories and industrial producers supported
the main principles and objectives of the regime.197 All signatories had a vested interest in
making the Montreal Protocol successful. Most other forms of transboundary pollution lack any
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such sort of consensus, let alone motivate abatement. The common expectation of environmental
agreements is either incidental or scant success in promoting abatement.

Thaure 78
Chapter 4: Barriers to Resolution

Though game theory models and real-world experience do not offer much hope for
resolving transboundary pollution, two fundamental barriers exist in the real world that prevent
agreements from reaching better outcomes. The first one is a policy norm: the polluter pays
principle. The second one is a legal norm: tort law and liability regimes for transboundary
pollution. This chapter discusses the problems that both norms pose for the resolution of
transboundary pollution.

The Polluter Pays Principle

The polluter pays principle has served as a general principle of international
environmental law and policy since its introduction by the OECD in 1972.198 The general aim of
the principle is simple: "Polluters should bear the expenses of carrying out measures...decided by
public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state." (OECD. 1972.) By
assuming the costs of pollution abatement, polluters then have the incentive to economize on
pollution, either through cutting down on output that results in pollution, implementing
technological solutions, or finding non-polluting substitutes for materials or production
processes. Though consumers of goods from polluting industries may bear some of the burden of
abatement through higher prices, the polluter bears the ultimate responsibility for undertaking
and financing abatement efforts. Many international agreements directly acknowledge and
198
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support the polluter pays principle, the most prominent of which include the Treaty of
Maastricht199 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992.200
The polluter pays principle aims to serve both efficiency and equity concerns, though the
OECD denies that it constitutes an equity principle.201 In terms of efficiency, the polluter pays
principle prevents nations from subsidizing abatement of pollution. Abatement subsidies create
distortions in a nation's domestic economy. Industries that benefit from abatement subsidies gain
additional income, which may affect their choice of pollution level. Subsidies also require some
method of financing. Taxes implemented to fund a subsidy can create their own distortions and
inefficiencies as well. So, the polluter pays principle steers national policies away from creating
the inefficiencies and distortions that result from subsidies.
Furthermore, the effects of an abatement subsidy spill over into international trade.
Industries that receive subsidies for abatement gain additional income, allowing them to undercut
competitors in the international market.202 When capital moves across international borders,
abatement subsidies encourage industries to move their production to nations that offer them.
Thus, the polluter pays principle also prevents distortions in international trade. Polluting
industries receive no special treatment regardless of where they locate when all nations adhere to
the principle. Though the same effect occurs if all nations offer the same subsidy, the polluter
pays principle prevents the race-to-the-bottom that would occur between nations as they compete
to offer subsidies.
In terms of equity, the polluter pays principle places the burden of abatement on the actor
with the most control over the polluting activity. Victims of pollution rarely exhibit any degree
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of control over polluting activities. Specifically, in the case of unidirectional transboundary
pollution, victims exhibit no direct control over polluting activities. Polluters, on the other hand,
subject victims to pollution and willfully elect to engage in a polluting activity. Cases of
reciprocal transboundary pollution complicate the distinction between victim and polluter. Each
actor may engage in a polluting activity, but they also suffer from the pollution of other actors.
Nonetheless, each actor exhibits no direct control over the polluting activity of other actors. In
both reciprocal and unidirectional cases, victims lack control over the polluting activities of
others whereas polluters exhibit full control of their own polluting activities. Therefore, placing
the burden of abatement on polluters satisfies equity concerns by targeting actors with the most
control over pollution.
However, the polluter pays principle warrants critique in relation to transboundary
pollution. Before undergoing that critique, though, it is important to note that transboundary
pollution remains outside the original premise of the principle. Most OECD documents
concerning the polluter pays principle fail to explicitly address transboundary pollution in any
context. Though the original 1972 recommendation lists "transfrontier pollution" among the
exceptions to the polluter pays principle—briefly and without any elaboration on the matter—no
such reference exists in subsequent recommendations in 1974 and 1992.203 Instead, the OECD
views trade distortions that arise from differences in cost allocation decisions between nations as
the central concern of the polluter pays principle.204 Nevertheless, the principle has become an
accepted policy norm in the realm of transboundary pollution. Many international transboundary
pollution agreements post-1990 make explicit reference to the polluter pays principle without
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defining it.205 In addition, both the history of international case law and international conventions
enshrine the polluter pays principle as a fundamental legal norm in transboundary pollution
disputes.206 Regardless of how the OECD views appropriate application of the polluter pays
principle, the international community applies it to transboundary pollution.
Though the polluter pays principle appears reasonable in terms of a nation's domestic
pollution policy, the principle conflicts with the realities and dynamics of transboundary
pollution between different political entities. To reiterate from the introduction of this project,
transboundary pollution normally takes place in an environment without a central regulatory
authority. A polluter pays principle necessitates some sort of institution that can enforce property
rights and legal obligations: the right of victims to a clean environment and the obligation of
polluters to assume the burden of pollution abatement. Without such an enforcement institution,
the principle meets with incentive problems.
Consider a case of unidirectional transboundary pollution, where a source nation emits
pollution and a victim nation bears damage from that pollution. The source nation receives
economic benefits from the output produced by polluting industries. Were the source nation to
engage in abatement, it would suffer either from the costs of abatement or the loss of potential
output, or both. Source nations have no economic incentive to embrace the polluter pays
principle with regards to themselves, since they benefit more from the status quo. Only the
victim gains from the application of the polluter pays principle. As the victim has no way to
force the polluter pays principle upon the source nation, the source nation may simply refuse to
acknowledge the principle.
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Aside from the problems of enforceability, the polluter pays principle also creates a
barrier to resolving transboundary pollution because it prevents the possibility of engaging in
transfer payments in exchange for abatement. Transfer payments embody a victim pays
principle. In the case of unidirectional pollution, the victim nation offers payment in exchange
for abatement from the source state. In the case of reciprocal pollution, nation that engage in
transfer payments assume the role of victims by paying for relief. Hence, transfer payments are
incompatible with the polluter pays principle.
Yet, transfer payments offer a useful resolution mechanism for transboundary pollution in
both theoretical and practical application. In terms of theory, the use of transfer payments
expands the action set of victim nations in unidirectional games. In reciprocal games, transfer
payments allow for the expansion of coalitions. Assuming cooperation and commitment, extra
benefits generated by the coalition can finance payments that encourage other members to join.
The polluter pays principle denies actors of any of these options, leaving victim states without
recourse for alleviation and coalitions without a method to encourage expansion.
As an example of practical application, the Montreal Protocol clearly violates the polluter
pays principle through the operation of its multi-lateral fund. The fund is a transfer program
between developed and developing nations whereby funds from developed nations are
exchanged for abatement in the developing world. Developed nations receive no such funding
for their abatement efforts. Yet, the multi-lateral fund benefits all parties involved in the
Montreal Protocol. Developing nations acquire the funds necessary to participate in the
agreement and developed nations prevent leakage from the agreement.
In addition, the polluter pays principle encourages the alienation of developing nations
from international environmental agreements. The need for developing nations to engage in
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economic development often outweighs their ability to abate any pollution that results from that
development.207 Thus, many developing nations refuse to acknowledge any responsibility for
global consequences of the pollution they create.208 In extreme cases, like the Kyoto protocol,
developing nations completely exempt themselves from any controls whatsoever. Forcing a
polluter pays principle on developing nations, in the context of international transboundary
pollution, serves only to agitate and prompt developing nations to either remain outside of an
agreement or seek special exemption.
The Montreal Protocol facilitated the inclusion of developing nations because it ignored
the polluter pays principle. By including a transfer payment program, the Montreal Protocol kept
developing nations under the agreement, holding them to abatement responsibilities while
providing the means and incentives to comply. Kyoto, offering no compensation to developing
nations, had no means to motivate an acceptance of abatement commitments. The only way
Kyoto won the approval of developing nations was by excluding them entirely from pollution
controls.
Arguably, the exceptions listed in OECD recommendations for the polluter pays principle
cover the use of transfer payments. OECD recommendations exclude the use of the polluter pays
principle in cases "where measures taken to promote a country's specific socio-economic
objectives, such as the reduction of serious inter-regional imbalances, would have the incidental
effect on constituting aid for pollution control purposes." (OECD. 1975.) Though the exception
mainly applies to imbalances within nations, the vague wording may also apply to imbalances
between nations. Nevertheless, the OECD does not explicit address transboundary pollution in its
recommendations. Furthermore, many more exceptions riddle the OECD recommendations:
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cases of stimulating experimentation with new technologies, cases of rapid implementation, and
even cases where implementation is simply too difficult are all listed exceptions.209 With all of
its exceptions considered, the polluter pays principle constitutes only a guiding principle in
international economic relations, not doctrine.
Despite that flexibility, the polluter pays principle remains a poor policy norm and
threatens the success of international environmental agreements. It remains inconsistent with
both theoretical application and practical experience. Even where international agreements
themselves do not embrace transfer payments, nations often engage in transfer payments through
existing foreign aid programs. Though the polluter pays principle may be sound policy for
foreign trade and domestic environmental policy, it limits the success of transboundary pollution
agreements.
Furthermore, international environmental agreements tend to find selective inspiration
from the policy and legal norms of past agreements. Kyoto, for example, misinterpreted the
differentiated responsibilities of the Montreal Protocol as exclusive responsibilities.
Policymakers operating only on the basis of broad policy norms may ignore exceptions to the
polluter pays principle entirely. Even a loose application or acknowledgement of the polluter
pays principle may compel nations to refuse to participate in transfer programs. The international
community needs to account for and clarify appropriate application of the polluter pays principle.
Otherwise, the principle will remain open to strict interpretation. Until that clarification, the
principle will continue to impede the resolution of transboundary pollution.

Legal Norms: Tort Law and Liability Regimes
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So far, we have only viewed transboundary pollution through an economic lens: how do
harm, costs, and benefits influence the behavior of economic actors involved in a transboundary
pollution problem? Do participants have an incentive to cooperate towards resolution? However,
international agreements, nations, and political actors are all creatures of law that respond to and
operate under legal norms as well as economic motives. Many international environmental
agreements are not pollution control regimes that hold states to abatement commitments at all.
Instead, they are liability regimes that assign blame, standards of care and diligence, and
recourse for damages. Liability regimes govern many cases of transboundary pollution, including
nuclear power generation, oil spills, and international trade in hazardous waste.
Liability regimes and control regimes are compatible with each other. An international
agreement can set pollution targets while also holding nations liable for transboundary damages
that result from their pollution. However, agreements rarely combine the two in practice. Most
pollution control agreements deliberately sidestep liability issues and many liability regimes lack
any pollution controls.210 So far, this project has only observed pollution control agreements,
which begs the question: what does it mean to resolve transboundary pollution through a liability
regime?
Surprisingly, international law lacks a consistent or broad body of law concerning
transboundary pollution. Treatment of transboundary pollution remains poorly developed in
practically all legal contexts.211 Most presently employed legal precedents and norms actually
stem from a handful of early 20th century cases from the Supreme Court of the United States.212
In terms of international law, the Trail Smelter Arbitration stands alone as one of the only
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examples of legal arbitration for transboundary pollution,213 and its precedent essentially
appropriated the American legal precedent of state liability for pollution between political
bodies.214 Needless to say, no thorough or mindful force crafted modern legal precedents for
transboundary pollution. Rather, a haphazard case-by-case history forms the basis of common
transboundary pollution law that guides current legal norms.
Nevertheless, modern legal norms and precedents for transboundary pollution find their
roots in tort law, which provides for a simple legal logic for hazardous enterprises: the one who
administers a dangerous activity is liable for the harm inflicted by the activity.215 Tort law
essentially affirms the polluter pays principle in a legal context. This precedent is established in
both US domestic law, with Missouri v. Illinois and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,216 and
international law, with the Trail Smelter Arbitration.217 However, instead of applying liability to
"the one who administers a dangerous activity," (i.e. the firm or person) international law has
historically applied it to the state, or nation, that houses a polluting activity. The Trail Smelter
Arbitration held Canada liable for the pollution damages in the United States caused by a smelter
within its borders.218 Aside from legal precedent, international environmental agreements also
establish state liability for transboundary pollution. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of
1972 declares that states have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." (United Nations Environment Program. 1972) Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration of 1992 echoes Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.219 So, through both legal
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precedent and international agreement, the international community ascribes liability to the
nation that originates transboundary pollution. Though nations may not wholly administer or
oversee polluting activities within their borders, they are, in principle, liable for any damages
born outside their borders caused by those activities.
Nevertheless, international law does not offer a clear norm governing the extent of a
nation's liability. Tort law distinguishes between three types of liability: strict liability,
negligence, and partial liability. On one hand, strict liability entails that a nation bears liability
for any and all pollution damage to which it subjects another nation. On the other hand, both
negligence and partial liability hold nations liable for damages in accordance with some standard
of reasonable care. In most legal contexts, that standard is left to courts to decide on a
comparative basis with available active precautionary measures.220 Negligence and partial
liability differ in that negligence holds nations liable for all damages when they fail to exercise
reasonable care, whereas partial liability holds nations liable for only those damages directly
resulting from the failure to exercise reasonable care.
Generally, international law has favored the application of strict liability in cases of
transboundary pollution. Many legal regimes apply strict liability to high-profile transboundary
pollution problems, such as nuclear power generation, oil spills, and transportation of hazardous
waste.221 However, strict liability is not necessarily encapsulated in precedent or foundational
legal treaties. The Stockholm and Rio declarations only call for state liability, not strict liability.
All degrees of liability have their trade-offs, advantages, and disadvantages. In practice,
courts struggle to identify the standard of reasonable care necessary for the application of
negligence or partial liability, whereas courts need not concern themselves with identifying a
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standard of reasonable care under strict liability.222 On the other hand, the need to establish a
standard of reasonable care under partial liability or negligence rations out claims of injury,
discouraging petty lawsuits that may arise under a standard of strict liability. 223 At the same time,
the burden of proving negligence rests with the victim, who usually lacks the ability deliver such
proof.224 So, strict liability offers the surest legal relief for victims at the risk of burdening the
judicial system, whereas negligence and partial liability limit the leverage of victims based on
available information.
Nevertheless, the legal norms of state liability and strict liability are not consistently
applied throughout international liability regimes. Most liability regimes for transboundary
pollution established post-1990 have largely abandoned the application of state liability in favor
of civil liability.225 Thus, modern liability regimes hold the owners and operators of hazardous
enterprises liable for transboundary pollution damages, not the nations where those activities are
carried out. Instead, nations are only expected to administer legal recourse through their own
judicial system when a dispute arises. Though state liability has largely been abandoned, strict
liability remains an active legal norm.226
Both state liability and strict liability act as barriers for resolution of transboundary
pollution disputes. State liability prevents resolution of transboundary pollution disputes because
pollution cannot easily be attributed to a nation as wrongful conduct on its behalf.227 As with
ozone-depleting substances, acid rain, and greenhouse gases, nations often lack any awareness of
transboundary pollution they engage in or suffer from until clear scientific developments. There
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is little care or precaution that nations can take against transboundary pollution when they lack
full knowledge of its effects or even existence. Moreover, victims are not guaranteed reparations
because they must file suit in the courts of the very nation that harmed them.228 Nonetheless,
state liability no longer posses much of a barrier to resolving transboundary pollution because it
has largely been abandoned.
Strict liability, on the other hand, remains an international legal norm. From a pure
bargaining perspective, strict liability acts as a barrier because it aggravates bargaining dynamics
between victims and polluters in a transboundary pollution dispute. Strict liability limits
outcomes to either full reparation or no reparation. Thus, both victims and polluters have their
entire interests at stake in a transboundary pollution lawsuit with strict liability.229 Those limited
outcomes do not allow for a partial settlement, such as transfer payments on condition of
abatement. Consider the case of unidirectional transboundary pollution. Partial relief may be
established through the use of transfer payments. However, if a victim operates under the norm
of strict liability, they have the incentive to bypass a negotiation process entirely and seek full
relief in a court of law. Confronted with strict liability, the polluter bears the incentive to avoid a
lawsuit and deny the pollution problem entirely even if it found a partial agreement
acceptable.230 This is despite the fact that both the victim and polluter benefit from a partial
settlement based on transfer payments: the victim receives less pollution and the polluting nation
receives payment in exchange for abatement. Strict liability encourages nations to take extreme
positions that clash with mutual resolution. Therefore, strict liability limits transboundary
pollution resolution to extreme outcomes.
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In addition, strict liability often places a high burden of proof on the victim party.231
Considering the lack of scientific knowledge often involved in a transboundary pollution dispute,
victims often have little means to prove that they damage suffer from directly results from the
actions of a source entity. Such was the case with Missouri v. Illinois. Missouri also dumped
sewage into its own rivers, so the state had no way to prove that its suffering was caused by
sewage from Illinois.232 Most reciprocal transboundary pollution encounters the same problem.
Consider the case of acid rain in Europe. Nations bore damages from a combination of chemical
fluxes from surrounding nations without a clear method to determine which fluxes arose from
which sources. Strict liability offers the best potential outcome for victims but requires an
unreasonable burden of proof.
The only example of transboundary pollution that has found workable resolution through
strict liability is international oil spills.233 However, oil spills are the exception that proves the
rule. With international oil spills, the origins and extent of damage are both clear and simple to
prove in a court of law. In addition, as trans-national oil shipment is a well-established
enterprise, a reasonable standard of care exists to weigh injuries against. Few other
transboundary pollutants involve the same features of clarity and precedent.
Arguably, all forms of liability fail to harmonize with the realities of transboundary
pollution. Even negligence and partial liability remain problematic because they require an
establishment of reasonable care. Given the novelty of most transboundary pollution problems as
they arise, no such standard may be established until well after damages have occurred. Hence,
legal recourse offers even less hope for resolution of transboundary pollution than the economic
bargaining reviewed throughout this project. Though it may be appropriate to establish liability
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guidelines for hazardous enterprises, liability regimes in and of themselves cannot hope to
resolve transboundary pollution problems. Legal recourse and pure liability regimes should be
limited only to cases where clear and capable judicial authority and exists and where reasonable
care and sufficient proof of pollution sources may be established. Unfortunately, many crucial
transboundary pollution problems lack either circumstance.

Conclusions

Both liability norms and the polluter pays principle conflict with the resolution of
transboundary pollution. However, the removal of either norm brings with it further problems.
Though liability norms rarely resolve transboundary pollution in and of themselves, they
nonetheless communicate expectations for international enterprise and encourage preventative
care through the power of diffuse reciprocity. In addition, liability and control regimes remain
compatible with each other. Instead of abandoning liability concepts altogether, an
environmental regime may set liability standards while resolving pollution primarily trough
abatement controls.
The removal of the polluter pays principle, however, does not lend itself to a simple
solution. While the removal of the polluter pays principle does not imply the establishment of a
victim pays principle, it nonetheless allows for the victim pays principle to operate. With the
potential to receive transfer payments under a victim pays principle, nations may find it attractive
to substitute domestic pollution for transboundary pollution, thus leading to an increase in
transboundary pollution.
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Nonetheless, by linking policy issues together, nations may induce each other to
cooperate against extreme outcomes in the absence of a polluter pays principle. Because
international transboundary pollution takes place in a dynamic setting, nations may discourage
substitution by linking substitution issues together. Essentially, when all nations wield the
opportunity to substitute into transboundary pollution, each nation must anticipate that
substitution on their behalf leads to further substitution by other nations, making all nations
worse off. Thus, linkage mitigates the threat of substitution.
Nevertheless, the polluter pays principle bears similar value to liability norms in the sense
that both communicate the importance of preventative action against transboundary pollution.
Yet, the establishment of liability norms within an environmental control regime accomplishes
the same goal without the burden of preventing transfer payments. As long as nations aim to
resolve pollution primarily through abatement controls, liability norms in international
environmental agreements may encapsulate the polluter pays principle without interfering with
the resolution process.
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Final Conclusions

Even without binding regulatory institutions, transboundary pollution does not result in a
hopeless tragedy of the commons. Though some agreements have failed, international effort
currently abates and manages many transboundary pollutants that threaten significant damage
through innovative institutions. Nonetheless, transboundary pollution conflicts with the
incentives of individual actors, discouraging the possibility of full resolution. Both game theory
and real-world agreements demonstrate that nations remain unlikely to cooperate on
transboundary pollution without key institutional arrangements, which in and of themselves
require cooperation. Even removing the barriers caused by the polluter pays principle or liability
regimes may not result in much improvement beyond the current status quo of international
environmental negotiations. Transboundary pollution resolutions are not likely to achieve the
most efficient outcome possible for all nations involved.
With the right mechanisms, practical experience demonstrates that international
environmental cooperation responds better to immediate threats of significant and clear damage.
Such was the case with ozone-depleting substances and acid rain. However, problems like
climate change, where damages are unclear and expected to accrue over a wide timescales, clash
with the interests of uncertainty-adverse, future-discounting nations. Truly, climate change is one
of the greatest challenges this century faces precisely because it threatens future generations with
relatively intangible damages. By the time present damages become severe enough to motivate
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action, international abatement efforts may not be able to halt the positive feedback cycles of
climate change, let alone reverse them.
Nevertheless, this project has only viewed transboundary pollution as a singular policy
issue. As single issues, transboundary pollution agreements are unstable due to free-riding
incentives and payoff asymmetries. However, linking different transboundary pollution issues
together in the same negotiations can reduce those problems. Issue linkage can stabilize an
agreement in the same way that institutional arrangements can, leading to a more symmetric
distribution of gains from cooperation.234 The loss by one nation in a transboundary pollution
dispute may simply be offset by a gain in another area of policy.235 In addition, issue linkage can
expand the action set of victim nations in a situation of unidirectional transboundary pollution,236
providing a similar function to transfer payments. Issue linkage also increases the power of
trigger strategies by allowing nations to respond to free-riding in one issue by severing other
agreements.
Though many game theory models already consider issue linkage,237 future research
should consider limiting linkage with transboundary pollution to other transboundary pollution
problems. Linking transboundary pollution with other unrelated international issues may create
enormous transaction costs and prevent flexibility in negotiations. Limiting linkage to only other
pollution problems allows nations to resolve multiple issues of transboundary pollution together,
maintaining the benefits of more symmetric payoffs and powerful triggers, without spillovers
into other critical international issues.
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Finally, the development of scientific research and technological advancement remains
fundamental to resolving transboundary pollution. The more information available to
policymakers and nations, the more likely that environmental agreements will result in more
equitable and efficient arrangements. Aside from encouraging scientific advancement and
consensus, future agreements should also include technical and engineering experts into their
implementation process in the spirit of the Montreal Protocol to reconcile policy commitments
with practical constraints.
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